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ARTICLE
A “COMMON” PROPOSAL
*

Stacey A. Tovino
ABSTRACT

The Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects (the
“Common Rule”) is codified in separate regulations by seventeen
federal departments and agencies, including the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS). HHS’s version of the
Common Rule currently contains a basic policy for the protection
of all human subjects, codified at Subpart A of the Common Rule,
as well as special provisions governing human subjects research
involving three sets of vulnerable populations, including
pregnant women, fetuses, and neonates (Subpart B); prisoners
(Subpart C); and children (Subpart D). This Article proposes that
HHS amend the Common Rule to add a new Subpart E governing
human subjects research involving adults with impaired
decision-making capacity.
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INTRODUCTION

This Article responds to the recent request by the federal
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) for guidance
regarding how “regulations for protecting human subjects who
participate in research might be modernized and revised to be
1
more effective.” As background, current federal regulations
governing human subjects research were developed decades ago
when research studies were generally conducted at one research
site, such as a single university or a single medical center.2
Although HHS has amended its regulations over the years, the
regulations “have not kept pace with the evolving human
research enterprise,” including the marked increase in the
volume of biomedical and behavioral research; “the proliferation
of multi-site clinical trials and observational studies”; the
expansion of research in particular areas, including neurology
and psychiatry; and the use of new research technologies,

1. See Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research
Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg.
44,512, 44,512 (proposed July 26, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 46, 160, 164; 21
C.F.R. pts. 50, 56).
2. See id.
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including functional magnetic resonance imaging.3 Stakeholders
have criticized the decades-old regulations on many grounds,
including the extent and quality of the protections afforded by
the regulations’ consent provisions, the lack of calibration
between the risks posed by a particular research protocol and the
required level of institutional review, and “the multiple [and]
differing regulatory requirements that can apply to a single
research study.”4
This Article focuses on one particular area of regulatory
criticism; that is, the lack of federal regulation and the
patchwork of state regulation in the context of human subjects
5
research involving adults with impaired decision-making
capacity, including adults with neurological, psychiatric, and
developmental conditions.6 Elsewhere, others7 and I8 have
reviewed the American history of human subjects research,
including research studies in which scientists enrolled captive
populations of vulnerable individuals in dangerous experiments,
the goals of which were unrelated to the individuals’ health
conditions.9 Many individuals with neurological, psychiatric, and
3. See id. at 44,512–13.
4. See id. at 44,513–14.
5. HHS-conducted or -supported human subjects research involving children is
already regulated at 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.401–409 (2011).
6. Individuals with impaired decision-making capacity include, but are not limited
to (1) individuals with disorders of consciousness, such as coma, vegetative state, and
minimally conscious state, that eliminate or severely impair cognitive abilities;
(2) individuals with neurological conditions, such as dementia, that may impair some or
all cognitive abilities; (3) individuals with psychiatric conditions, such as schizophrenia,
that may impair some or all cognitive abilities; and (4) individuals with developmental
and intellectual disabilities, such as mental retardation, that may impair some cognitive
abilities. See infra notes 24, 27, 118–122, 162 and accompanying text.
7. For a history of human subjects research in the United States, see, for example,
GEORGE J. ANNAS & MICHAEL A. GRODIN, THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE:
HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 1–275 (1992) CARL H. COLEMAN ET AL., THE
ETHICS AND REGULATION OF RESEARCH WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS 3–239 (2005); CYNTHIA
MCGUIRE DUNN & GARY L. CHADWICK, PROTECTING STUDY VOLUNTEERS IN RESEARCH 1–
16 (4th ed. 2012); MARGARET L. EATON & DONALD KENNEDY, INNOVATION IN MEDICAL
TECHNOLOGY: ETHICAL ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 37–46 (2007); RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L.
BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT 151–232 (1986); JONATHAN
D. MORENO, IS THERE AN ETHICIST IN THE HOUSE?: ON THE CUTTING EDGE OF BIOETHICS
109–52 (2005); LAINIE FRIEDMAN ROSS, CHILDREN IN MEDICAL RESEARCH 12–43 (2006);
THE ETHICS OF RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS 1–144 (Harold Y. Vanderpool ed.,
1996).
8. See Stacey A. Tovino, Neuroimaging Research into Disorders of Consciousness:
Moral Imperative or Legal and Ethics Failure?, 13 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 22–42 (2008),
http://www.vjolt.net/vol13/issue1/v13i1_a2-Tovino.pdf (providing an abbreviated history of
human subjects research involving vulnerable populations).
9. In the early 1950s, for example, the U.S. Army Chemical Center investigated
the use of hallucinogenic compounds as potential chemical warfare agents on a confined
population—the patients at the New York State Psychiatric Institute (the “Institute”).
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developmental disabilities died or became ill as a result of their
research inclusion.10 In light of this history, some stakeholders
have called for stronger legal protections for human subjects who
11
have impaired decision-making capacity. Other stakeholders,
including many clinicians and scientists, support further
biomedical and behavioral research involving individuals with
impaired decision-making capacity in order to contribute to
generalizable knowledge regarding the individuals’ underlying
physical and mental health conditions.12 Two particular questions
Barrett v. United States, 660 F. Supp. 1291, 1295 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). Pursuant to the Army’s
research protocol, Institute patients were injected with chemical derivatives of mescaline,
a hallucinogenic alkaloid of the phenethylamine class, and clinical response data was
provided by the Institute to the Army. See id. at 1294–96. At least one research subject—a
former tennis professional and ranked tennis player named Harold Blauer, who was
receiving psychiatric care at the Institute for major depression and pseudo-neurotic
schizophrenia—died following his fifth mescaline injection. Id. at 1298–300, 1317. The
purpose of the research was not to develop a treatment or cure for depression or the other
conditions with which the Institute patients were diagnosed; instead, the research was
designed to “provide a firmer basis for the utilization of psychochemical agents . . . for
offensive use as sabotage weapons” and to develop protections against the psychochemical
agents in military activity. Id. at 1295, 1299 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Historians, ethicists and law professors who subsequently reviewed the Army’s chemical
warfare research have concluded that it posed risks to Blauer and his fellow subjects that
were unreasonable in relation to the military knowledge that was expected to result, that
the research was inappropriately conducted in a captive and vulnerable population of
individuals with mental illness whose further treatment was conditioned on participation
in the dangerous research protocol, that the researchers failed to inform the research
subjects of the military purpose of the experiment and of the known risks associated with
mescaline, and that some of the research subjects may not have had the capacity to give
consent due to their severe mental illnesses. See, e.g., Cyril H. Wecht, Research and
Experimentation, in LEGAL MEDICINE 175, 176 (S. Sandy Sanbar, ed., 7th ed. 2007)
Moreno, supra note 7, at 159–62; Tovino, supra note 8, at 27–29; see also FADEN &
BEAUCHAMP, supra note 7, at 159.
10. See, e.g., Tovino, supra note 8, at 23, 29–31.
11. See, e.g., Stefan Eriksson, On the Need for Improved Protections of Incapacitated
and Non-Benefiting Research Subjects, 26 BIOETHICS 15, 15 20–21 (2012) (“[T]he present
guidelines allow for the possibility of vulnerable people being exploited, something that is
hidden behind a guise of solidarity. Instead we need to address the real issues at stake by
rewriting these statutes. . . . However, in order to protect these subjects there is
additional need for appointed representatives who monitor research and for legal
obligations to compensate for any injuries suffered. Without these or similar
measures . . . we won’t have an adequate system in place for the protection of nonbenefiting persons who are unable to consent to research.”); PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR
THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, MORAL SCIENCE: PROTECTING PARTICIPANTS IN HUMAN
SUBJECTS RESEARCH 5 (2011) (“[T]he Commission cannot conclude that all federally
funded research provides optimal protections against avoidable harms and unethical
treatment. The Commission finds significant room for improvement in several areas
where, for example, immediate changes can be made to increase accountability and
thereby reduce the likelihood of harm or unethical treatment.”).
12. See, e.g., Scott Y.H. Kim et al., Proxy and Surrogate Consent in Geriatric
Neuropsychiatric Research: Update and Recommendations, 161 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 797,
797 (2004) (“There is evidence that conservative risk management strategies by
institutional review boards and their institutions may severely restrict research with
decisionally impaired subjects.”); Elyn R. Saks et al., Proxy Consent to Research: The
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over which academic and professional stakeholders (including
law professors, ethicists, clinicians, and scientists) frequently
disagree include the general question of how human subjects
research involving adults with impaired decision-making
capacity should be regulated at the federal and state level and
the more specific question of who, if anyone, should be permitted
to consent to research on behalf of adults who have very impaired
or no decision-making capacity.13
On July 26, 2011, HHS issued an Advanced Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) requesting public comments on
proposals to seven areas of current federal regulation as well as
answers to seventy-four specific questions relating to human
14
Through its proposal of new federal
subjects research.
regulations governing human subjects research involving adults
with impaired decision-making capacity, this Article responds to
one of HHS’s broad proposals relating to improvement of the
consent process15 and three of HHS’s specific questions relating to
the adequacy of consent forms, the level of research participant
comprehension required, and the desirability of additional
consent process requirements.16
Legal Landscape, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 37, 39 (2008) (“It is urgent that
research on [Alzheimer’s] disease be strongly encouraged and facilitated.”); Douglas
Steinberg, Consciousness Is Missing—and So Is Research, 6 EMBO REP. 1009, 1011
(2005) (“[S]ome observers see a moral imperative, not just an ethical trap, in the study of
consciousness disorders.”).
13. See, e.g., Evan G. DeRenzo, Decisionally Impaired Persons in Research: Refining
the Proposed Refinements, 25 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 139, 139 (1997) (“The ethics of involving
persons with cognitive impairments and/or mental illness in research continues to gain
academic and public attention. . . . [Relevant questions include] not only when and from
whom informed consent may be obtained but also under what conditions it is ethically
permissible to involve persons in research who are too decisionally impaired to provide
their own consent.”); Saks et al., supra note 12, at 39 (“When an adult suffers from a
disorder that impairs his or her capacity to consent, may another person enroll that
individual in research? The answer, it appears, is not a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no,’ but rather ‘it
depends.’”).
14. See Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research
Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg.
44,512, 44,514, 44,517–29 (proposed July 26, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 46,
160, 164; 21 C.F.R. pts. 50, 56) (summarizing the seven sets of potential refinements and
listing the seventy-four specific questions).
15. HHS’s third broad proposal relates to “[i]mprovement of consent forms and the
consent process.” Id. at 44,514.
16. HHS’s 36th question asks,
What additional information, if any, should be required by the regulations to
assure that consent forms appropriately describe to subjects, in concise and clear
language, alternatives to participating in the research study and why it may or
may not be in their best interests to participate? What modifications or deletions
to the required elements would be appropriate?
Id. at 44,523. HHS’s 38th question asks, “Should the regulations require that, for certain
types of studies, investigators assess how well potential research subjects comprehend the
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This Article proceeds as follows: Part II of this Article
examines federal and state authorities governing human subjects
research involving adults with impaired decision-making
capacity. Part II finds that current federal law does not provide
specific guidance regarding the conduct of human subjects
research involving adults with impaired decision-making
capacity or consent to research by or on behalf of adults with
impaired decision-making capacity and that state law in this
area varies widely, when it exists. Part II also finds that the lack
of federal regulation and the patchwork of state law has made it
difficult for American scientists, academic medical centers,
institutional review boards, scientific journals, and funding
agencies to agree on an applicable ethical and legal framework,
especially when research may be conducted in a laboratory
located in one city but will draw research participants who are
residents of neighboring states, as well as in the context of multisite and multi-state research.17 Part II further finds that the
federal Office for Human Research Protections and some
members of the clinical and scientific communities support
reliance on legislation governing consent to treatment in the
absence of state law specifically addressing consent to research.18
Given the support by the government and some members of
the clinical and scientific communities for reliance on legislation
governing consent to treatment to answer research-related
questions, Part III of this Article examines and identifies the
salient features of federal regulation and state legislation
governing consent to treatment. Part IV argues that legislation
governing consent to treatment should not be used to answer
questions relating to consent to research because (i) treatment
and
research
are
intrinsically
different
activities;
(ii) government-supported reliance on legislation governing
consent to treatment to answer questions relating to consent to
research could provide continued legal and conceptual support
for the therapeutic misconception; and (iii) the content of
legislation governing consent to treatment may be inappropriate
for research-related questions in light of the unique role of the
researcher—that is, the role of collecting data and reporting
research results, not holding the best physical and mental health
information provided to them before they are allowed to sign the consent form?” Id. HHS’s
40th question asks, “Would informed consent be improved if the regulations included
additional requirements regarding the consent process, and if so, what should be
required? For example, should investigators be required to disclose in consent forms
certain information about the financial relationships they have with study sponsors?” Id.
17. See infra text accompanying note 99.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 113–114.
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interests of research participants as paramount. To support the
argument that legislation governing consent to treatment should
not be used to answer questions relating to consent to research,
Part IV references and relies on other areas of health law that
distinguish treatment and research and establish more stringent
requirements for research.
Part V of this Article finds that the current law review and
other academic literatures tend to polarize conversations about
the regulation of human subjects research involving adults with
impaired decision-making capacity into strong protection-based
arguments, on the one hand, and clinical- and research-based
arguments made in support of further biomedical and behavioral
research, on the other.19 Part V contends that the literature could
benefit from a more well-rounded dialogue that includes insights
from not only law professors, ethicists, clinicians, and scientists,
but also from laypersons, including current and future patients
and human subjects.20 Stated slightly differently, Part V suggests
that lawmakers will continue to struggle crafting regulations
that protect and promote the autonomy of laypersons until
lawmakers better understand (i) the conditions under which
laypersons would consent to participate in research, including
riskless and risky research; (ii) whether and when laypersons
would grant a surrogate the authority to make a substituted
research participation decision; and (iii) the amount of leeway
laypersons would give to surrogates in making substituted
research participation decisions.
To this end, Part V analyzes empirical studies investigating
current public attitudes towards human subjects research
involving adults with impaired decision-making capacity.21 These
empirical studies report somewhat surprising findings; that is,
that (i) surrogate consent to research is “probably” or “definitely”
acceptable in the context of minimal risk research; (ii) surrogate
consent to research may be appropriate in the context of more
risky studies; (iii) lay (or noncourt-appointed) surrogates should
be permitted to consent to riskless research on behalf of relatives
with
impaired
decision-making
capacity;
(iv) enrolling
individuals who are unable to consent to research in research
studies that offer no potential for medical benefit is consistent
with the preferences of at least some individuals and, therefore,
should not be absolutely prohibited provided there is sufficient
evidence that participation in such research is consistent with
19.
20.
21.

See infra note 246 and accompanying text.
See infra text accompanying notes 247–248.
See infra text accompanying notes 255–300.
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the preferences of such individuals; (v) requiring a completed
advance research directive (ARD) prior to research participation
by an individual with impaired decision-making capacity may be
unduly restrictive in light of studies suggesting that the rate of
ARD completion is likely to be low; and (vi) allowing some or
complete surrogate leeway, even over prior first-person consent,
is consistent with the preferences of at least some individuals
and should not be absolutely prohibited provided there is
sufficient evidence that surrogate leeway is consistent with the
preferences of such individuals.22
Rather than relabeling legislation governing consent to
treatment in an attempt to make it applicable to both the
treatment and research settings, Part VI argues that HHS
should add a new subpart (a Subpart “E”) to 45 C.F.R. Part 46
specifically governing human subjects research involving
adults with impaired decision-making capacity. The
regulations proposed in Part VI would reconcile potential
conflicts of interest between and among researchers,
surrogates, and adult research participants by requiring
researchers to recognize themselves and convey to research
participants and/or surrogates, as appropriate, (i) the
conceptual distinctions between treatment and research;
(ii) the specific differences between individualized, adaptable
treatment methods and protocol-driven, double-blind,
randomized, placebo-controlled research procedures; (iii) the
known, suspected, and unknown risks associated with the
research protocol; and (iv) the likelihood that research
participants may not directly benefit from the research.
II. CONSENT-TO-RESEARCH REGULATION
Investigators whose research is designed to improve
clinical practice in the areas of neurology, psychiatry,
geriatrics, emergency medicine, and critical care, among other
specialties, frequently design research protocols that involve
23
individuals with impaired decision-making capacity. Some of
22. See infra text accompanying notes 249–254.
23. See, e.g., B. Lynn Beattie, Consent in Alzheimer’s Disease Research: Risk/Benefit
Factors, 34 CAN. J. NEUROLOGICAL SCI. (SUPP.1) S27, S29 (2007) (noting that research in
Alzheimer’s disease is complicated by the disease itself, which affects the subject’s
decision-making capacity for participation in research); Scott Y. H. Kim et al., Assessing
the Competence of Persons with Alzheimer’s Disease in Providing Informed Consent for
Participation in Research, 158 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 712, 712 (2001) (noting that even
relatively mild Alzheimer’s disease can significantly impair consent-giving capacity in the
research context and that research in the field of Alzheimer’s disease therapeutics
increasingly includes participation by subjects with relatively mild Alzheimer’s disease);
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these protocols involve the neuroimaging of individuals who
have disorders of consciousness, including coma, vegetative
state, and minimally conscious state.24 In one recent study,
scientists from the United Kingdom and Argentina used
functional magnetic resonance imaging to investigate the
neural correlates of motor preparation in response to verbal
commands in a group of human subjects who met diagnostic
criteria for vegetative state, defined as “the absence of
awareness of self or the environment and preserved autonomic
functions.”25 In a second recent study, scientists from the
United Kingdom and Belgium used functional magnetic
resonance imaging to assess individuals with disorders of
consciousness with respect to their “ability to generate willful,

Ukamaka M. Oruche, Research with Cognitively Impaired Participants, 13 J. NURSING L.
89, 89 (2009) (noting that research involving individuals with cognitive impairments is
necessary to improve understanding of illnesses such as Alzheimer’s disease,
Huntington’s chorea, cerebrovascular disease, psychiatric disorders, chronic alcoholism,
and AIDS dementia complex).
24. See, e.g., M. R. Coleman et al., Towards the Routine Use of Brain Imaging to Aid
the Clinical Diagnosis of Disorders of Consciousness, 132 BRAIN 2541, 2541–51 (2009)
(describing the functional brain imaging findings from a group of forty-one individuals
with disorders of consciousness who undertook a hierarchical speech processing task,
concluding that functional neuroimaging has the potential to inform the diagnostic
decision-making process for persons with disorders of consciousness); Davinia FernándezEspejo et al., Combination of Diffusion Tensor and Functional Magnetic Resonance
Imaging During Recovery from the Vegetative State, BMC NEUROLOGY, Sept. 3, 2010, at 1,
http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1471-2377-10-77.pdf
(using
functional
magnetic resonance imaging “to investigate cortical responses to passive language
stimulation as well as task-induced deactivations related to the default-mode network” in
one patient in the vegetative state “at one month post-ictus and . . . twelve months later
when he had recovered consciousness”); Joseph J. Fins, Neuroethics, Neuroimaging, and
Disorders of Consciousness: Promise or Peril?, 122 TRANSACTIONS AM. CLINICAL &
CLIMATOLOGICAL ASS’N 336, 336–37, 339–43 (2010) (reviewing research using functional
magnetic resonance imaging and positron emission tomography to elucidate brain states);
Olivia Gosseries et al., Disorders of Consciousness: What’s in a Name? 28
NEUROREHABILITATION 3, 4–9 (2011) (summarizing research studies designed to
investigate the residual neural capacity of individuals with disorders of consciousness)
Luaba Tshibanda et al., Neuroimaging After Coma, 52 NEURORADIOLOGY 15, 15–21 (2010)
(summarizing research studies using magnetic resonance spectroscopy, diffusion tensor
imaging, and functional magnetic resonance imaging to assess patients with disorders of
consciousness); Audrey Vanhaudenhuyse et al., Default Network Connectivity Reflects the
Level of Consciousness in Non-Communicative Brain-Damaged Patients, 133 BRAIN 161,
161–69 (2010) (using functional magnetic resonance imaging to investigate default
network connectivity in individuals with disorders of consciousness, including coma,
vegetative state, minimally conscious state, and locked-in syndrome).
25.
See Tristan Andres Bekinschtein et al., Functional Imaging Reveals
Movement Preparatory Activity in the Vegetative State, F RONTIERS H UM.
N EUROSCIENCE, Jan. 27, 2011, at 1, 1–3, 6–7 (citation omitted) (reporting results that
may reflect residual voluntary processing in some patients in the vegetative state
and suggesting that the identification of such activity using functional magnetic
resonance imaging may complement more traditional clinical assessments of patients
in the vegetative state).
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neuroanatomically specific, blood-oxygenation-level-dependent
responses during two . . . mental-imagery tasks.”26
Other protocols are designed to investigate the safety and
efficacy of experimental drugs and other interventions for
individuals who have mild, moderate, or severe dementia or
mental illness and may have restricted or limited decision27
making capacity. In one recent study, scientists at the
University of California at San Diego, the University of
California at Irvine, and Rush University Medical Center in
Chicago conducted a phase 1 clinical trial of nerve growth factor
(NGF) gene delivery in eight individuals with early-stage
28
probable Alzheimer’s disease.
The study involved the
implantation of autologous fibroblasts genetically modified to
express human NGF into the subjects’ forebrains.29
Still other protocols, especially those designed to improve
clinical practice in the emergency room, may involve
experimental interventions for individuals with mild, moderate,
and severe traumatic brain injuries. In one illustrative study,
scientists at Korea’s Seo-Ulsan Boram Hospital investigated the
accuracy of diffusion-weighted magnetic resonance imaging in
assessing unconscious trauma patients when their computed

26. See Martin M. Monti et al., Willful Modulation of Brain Activity in Disorders of
Consciousness, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 579, 579, 588 (2010) (concluding that some
individuals in vegetative or minimally conscious states may have brain activations that
reflect some awareness and cognition).
27. See, e.g., Linda Beuscher & Victoria T. Grando, Challenges in Conducting
Qualitative Research with Persons with Dementia, 2 RES. GERONTOLOGICAL NURSING 6,
6–7 (2009) (discussing consent to research and other challenging issues raised by the
conduct of qualitative research involving individuals with dementia); Sabina Gainotti et
al., How Are the Interests of Incapacitated Research Participants Protected Through
Legislation? An Italian Study on Legal Agency for Dementia Patients, PLOS, June 2010,
at 1, 1, http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0011150
(noting that “[r]esearch involving individuals with compromised mental ability can be
ethically challenging” due to “their [impaired] ability to give free and informed consent”);
S.Y.H. Kim et al., Surrogate Consent for Dementia Research: A National Survey of Older
Americans, 72 NEUROLOGY 149, 149 (2009) (“Research in novel therapies for Alzheimer’s
Disease (AD) relies on persons with AD as research subjects.”); Robin Pierce, A Changing
Landscape for Advance Directives in Dementia Research, 70 SOC. SCI. & MED. 623, 623,
629 (2010) (noting that “one of the primary challenges to conducting research on
dementia . . . is the gradual loss of the capacity to consent” to research participation by
individuals with dementia).
28. Mark H. Tuszynski et al., A Phase 1 Clinical Trial of Nerve Growth Factor Gene
Therapy for Alzheimer Disease, 11 NATURE MED. 551, 551–52 (2005).
29. See id. The study detected “no adverse effects attributable to the delivery of
NGF itself or to the gene-delivery vector after 18–24 months of monitoring, including
weight loss or pain”; found that post-experiment functional neuroimaging showed
significant increases in cortical 18-fluorodeoxyglucose uptake, “a reversal of usual decline
in Alzheimer disease”; and concluded that “[a]dditional clinical trials of NGF for
Alzheimer disease are warranted.” Id.
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tomography (CT) brain scans were unremarkable.30 In a second
study, scientists at China’s Hangzhou Normal University and
Zhejiang University investigated the efficacy of unilateral
decompressive
craniectomy
and
unilateral
routine
temporoparietal craniectomy in reducing intracranial pressure in
patients with unilateral acute post-traumatic brain injury.31
Federal and state laws that govern the conduct of research
studies such as these may best be described as an incomplete
patchwork.32 As discussed in more detail in Part II.A–B, below,
the federal and state governments have for more than three
decades swung back and forth between the competing goals of
protecting vulnerable human subjects and fostering biomedical
and behavioral health research.33 One result is that federal law
still does not contain specific regulations governing human
subjects research involving adults with impaired decision-making
capacity,34 some states support such research with few
restrictions,35 and other states prohibit all such research without
the prospect of either direct medical benefit to the potential
human subject or obtaining generalizable knowledge about the
human subject’s disorder or condition.36 Issues on which
stakeholders disagree include (i) whether researchers should be
required to demonstrate that a research study classified as
minimal risk37 relates to an individual’s psychiatric, neurological,
30. Je Sung You et al., Use of Diffusion-Weighted MRI in the Emergency
Department for Unconscious Trauma Patients with Negative Brain CT, 27 EMERGENCY
MED. J. 131, 131–32 (2010).
31. See Wusi Qiu et al., Effects of Unilateral Decompressive Craniectomy on Patients
with Unilateral Acute Post-Traumatic Brain Swelling After Severe Traumatic Brain
Injury,
CRITICAL
CARE,
R185,
Nov.
23,
2009,
at
1,
1–2,
4–5,
http://ccforum.com/content/pdf/cc8178.pdf (finding that unilateral decompressive
craniectomy (DC) lowers intracranial pressure, “reducing the mortality rate and
improving neurological outcomes over unilateral routine temporoparietal craniectomy[;]”
also finding that “[DC] increases the incidence of delayed intracranial hematomas and
subdural effusion, some of which need secondary surgical intervention”).
32. See infra Part II.A–B; see also Oruche, supra note 23, at 92 (summarizing gaps
in federal and state regulation of human subjects research involving individuals with
cognitive impairments).
33. See, e.g., Kim et al., supra note 27, at 149–50 (explaining that “policy uncertainties
have continued for three decades” and that “policy discussions regarding surrogate-based
research (SBR) have continued for three decades without a clear resolution”).
34. See infra Part II.A.
35. See infra Part II.B (describing California’s law on such research); see also Carl
H. Coleman, Research with Decisionally Incapacitated Human Subjects: An Argument for
a Systematic Approach to Risk-Benefit Analysis, 83 IND. L.J.743, 760–61 (2008).
36. See infra Part II.B (discussing New Jersey’s law on such research).
37. HHS defines “minimal risk” to mean that “the probability and magnitude of
harm or discomfort anticipated in the research are not greater in and of themselves than
those ordinarily encountered in daily life or during the performance of routine physical or
psychological examinations or tests.” 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(i) (2011).
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or other condition before an individual with the condition is
permitted to be enrolled in the research; (ii) whether it is ever
permissible to enroll individuals with impaired decision-making
capacity in research classified as greater than minimal risk and,
if so (A) whether the greater than minimal risk research
intervention must hold out the prospect of direct benefit to the
individual; (B) whether the individual is required to have
executed an advance research directive through which the
individual gave prior consent to research participation;
(C) whether a surrogate may consent to the individual’s research
participation in the absence of an advance research directive; and
(D) whether a special standing panel or other similar body that
has expertise in research involving individuals with impaired
decision-making capacity also should be required to review and
approve the individual’s research participation.38
A. Federal Law
Over the past three decades, various federal commissions
and regulatory agencies have provided different responses to
these questions. On February 2, 1978, the National Commission
for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and
Behavioral Research (Commission) issued a report and
recommendations relating to human subjects research involving
institutionalized individuals with “mental infirmity.”39 Among
other things, the Commission recommended that individuals who
lack decision-making capacity be allowed to participate in
minimal risk research, but only if the research related to the
individual’s condition or the individual assents or does not object
to the research.40 For example, an individual with severe
dementia but without osteoporosis would be permitted to be

38. See, e.g., Kim et al., supra note 27, at 149 (noting that policies for surrogate
consent for research remain unsettled after decades of debate). In 2002, for example, the
Executive Vice Chancellor of UCLA issued a university-wide moratorium on approval of
research involving individuals with impaired decision-making capacity unless a courtappointed conservator consented to the individual’s research participation. See Saks et al.,
supra note 12, at 41–42 & n.10 (citing Memorandum from Daniel M. Neuman, Executive
Vice Chancellor, Univ. of Cal., L.A., to the Deans, Department Chairs, Division Chiefs,
Investigators, and Research Personnel of Univ. of Cal., L.A., RE: Moratorium on IRB
Approval of Surrogate or Proxy Informed Consent for Human Subjects Research (Sept. 30,
2002)). Although California law has since been changed to allow surrogates to consent to
research participation on behalf of individuals with impaired decision-making capacity,
not all state legislatures agree with the approach taken by California. See infra Part II.B.
39. See generally THE NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF
BIOMEDICAL
AND
BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH,
RESEARCH
INVOLVING
THOSE
INSTITUTIONALIZED AS MENTALLY INFIRM (1978).
40. Id. at 7–8.
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enrolled in minimal risk dementia research, but not minimal risk
osteoporosis research. For research that posed greater than
minimal risk, the Commission recommended that the research
intervention hold out the prospect of direct benefit to the
individual.41 For example, the Commission would allow an
individual with severe depression to be enrolled in greater than
minimal risk research, but only if the research held out the
prospect of alleviating the individual’s depression.
Although the former Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (HEW) proposed regulations on November 17, 1978,
42
based on the Commission’s report (Proposed Regulations), HEW
never adopted final regulations addressing research involving
individuals with impaired decision-making capacity.43 The
Proposed Regulations would have allowed minimal risk research
involving individuals lacking decision-making capacity to proceed
if the research was relevant to the individual’s condition, the
individual assented or did not object to research participation,
and the individual’s legally authorized representative (LAR)
consented to the individual’s participation.44
The Proposed Regulations also would have allowed the
conduct of greater than minimal risk research involving
individuals who lack decision-making capacity if the research
involved an intervention that held out the prospect of direct
benefit for the individual, the risks were justified by the prospect
of benefit to the individual, “[t]he relation of the risk to
anticipated benefit . . . [was] at least as favorable as that
presented by available alternative approaches,” the individual
assented to research participation, and the individual’s LAR
45
consented to the individual’s participation.
In addition, the Proposed Regulations would have allowed
the conduct of greater than minimal risk research involving
individuals who lack decision-making capacity even if the
research did not hold out the prospect of direct benefit if the risk
involved represented a minor increase over minimal risk, the
anticipated knowledge was of vital importance for understanding
41. Id. at 11.
42. Protection of Human Subjects: Proposed Regulations on Research Involving
Those Institutionalized as Mentally Disabled, 43 Fed. Reg. 53,950, 53,950–56 (proposed
Nov. 17, 1978).
43. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101–505 (2011) (lacking incorporation of the proposed
regulations).
44. Protection of Human Subjects: Proposed Regulations on Research Involving
Those Institutionalized as Mentally Disabled, 43 Fed. Reg. at 53,955 (proposing 45 C.F.R.
§ 46.505(b)(2)).
45. Id. at 53,956 (proposing 45 C.F.R. § 46.506(a)(1)–(4)(ii)).
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or ameliorating the individual’s disorder or condition, and the
individual gave informed consent to research participation.46 If
the individual lacked capacity to give informed consent, the
Commission would require the individual to assent to research
participation and the individual’s LAR to consent to the
individual’s participation.47 If the individual lacked the capacity
to assent but did not object to research participation, both the
individual’s LAR and a court of competent jurisdiction must
consent to the individual’s participation.48
Finally, the Proposed Regulations would have allowed the
conduct of research not otherwise approvable if the research
presented an “opportunity to further the understanding,
prevention, or alleviation of a serious problem affecting” the
individuals’ health or welfare and the Secretary of HEW, “after
consultation with a panel of experts in pertinent disciplines (e.g.,
science, medicine, education, ethics, law) and following
opportunity for public review and comment,” determined
that (i) the research would “be in accord with basic ethical
principles
of
beneficence,
justice,
and
respect
for
persons,” (ii) that the “research presents a reasonable
opportunity to further the understanding, prevention, or
alleviation of a serious problem affecting the health or welfare of
individuals institutionalized as mentally disabled,” and (iii) that
“[a]dequate provisions [were] made for obtaining consent of those
[individuals] capable of giving fully informed consent, the assent
of other [individuals], and the consent of their [LARs], and,
where appropriate, the authorization of a court of competent
jurisdiction.”49
On April 18, 1979, the Commission published in the Federal
Register its “Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection
of Human Subjects of Research” (Belmont Report), which
identified and examined three basic ethical principles (respect for
persons, beneficence, and justice) that are relevant to the conduct
50
The Belmont Report also
of human subjects research.
recognized, however, that (i) special provisions may need to be
made for research participants with impaired decision-making
capacity, (ii) the principle of respect for persons may require
consent to research participation to come from a third party who

46. Id. (proposing 45 C.F.R. § 46.507(a)(1)–(4)(i)).
47. Id. (proposing 45 C.F.R. § 46.507(a)(4)(ii)).
48. Id. (proposing 45 C.F.R. § 46.507(a)(4)(iii)).
49. Id. (proposing 45 C.F.R. § 46.508(a)–(b)).
50. Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human
Subjects of Research, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192, 23,192–94 (Apr. 18, 1979).
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is most likely to understand the individual’s situation and to act
in the individual’s best interest, and (iii) the third party should
have the opportunity to observe the research as it proceeds and
withdraw the individual from the research if withdrawal is in the
individual’s best interest.51 By 1991, a total of seventeen federal
agencies, including HEW and its successor, HHS, published
proposed and final regulations governing human subjects
research (the “Common Rule”) that were based in large part on
the three ethical principles identified in the Belmont Report.52
Today, the Common Rule contains a “Basic HHS Policy for the
Protection of Human Subjects” (Basic Policy), which is codified at
Subpart A of the Common Rule,53 as well as special provisions
governing human subjects research involving three sets of
vulnerable populations, including pregnant women, fetuses, and
neonates (Subpart B),54 prisoners (Subpart C),55 and children
56
(Subpart D).
The Common Rule does not, however, contain a special
subpart governing research involving adults with impaired
57
decision-making capacity. As a result, proposed research that
would involve adults with impaired decision-making capacity
must satisfy only four general provisions set forth in the Basic
Policy. First, institutional review boards (IRBs) must ensure that
a researcher’s selection of subjects for the research protocol is
equitable.58 In assessing selection equity, the Basic Policy
instructs reviewing IRBs to be “particularly cognizant of the
special problems of research involving vulnerable populations,
59
such as . . . mentally disabled persons.” The Basic Policy does
not expand on the special problems associated with individuals
who have mental disabilities.60 Second, IRBs must ensure that,
“[w]hen some or all of the subjects are likely to be vulnerable to
coercion or undue influence, such as . . . mentally disabled
51. Id. at 23,195.
52. Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research
Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg.
44,512, 44,512, 44,529 (proposed July 26, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 46, 160,
164; 21 C.F.R. pts. 50, 56).
53. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101–124 (2011).
54. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.201–207.
55. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.301–306.
56. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.401–409.
57. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101–505 (lacking a Subpart for research involving adults
with impaired decision-making capacity).
58. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(3).
59. Id.
60. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101–505 (failing to provide details on the special problems
associated with individuals who have mental disabilities).
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persons, . . . additional safeguards have been included in the
study to protect the rights and welfare of these subjects.”61 The
Basic Policy does not identify the content of such additional
62
safeguards. Third, “[i]f an IRB regularly reviews research that
involves a vulnerable category of subjects, such as . . . mentally
disabled persons, consideration shall be given to the inclusion of
one or more individuals who are knowledgeable about and
experienced in working with these subjects.”63 The Basic Policy
does not expand on the requirement for the inclusion of
individuals who are knowledgeable about and experienced in
working with individuals with mental disabilities.64 Finally, IRBs
must ensure that informed consent to research participation has
been obtained from each prospective subject or the subject’s
LAR,65 defined elsewhere in the Basic Policy as “an individual or
judicial or other body authorized under applicable law to consent
on behalf of a prospective subject to the subject’s participation in
the procedure(s) involved in the research.”66 The phrase

61. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(b).
62. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101–505 (neglecting to specify what the additional safeguards
entail).
63. 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(a). Although the Basic Policy does not expand on this
requirement, the National Institutes of Health recently explained that an IRB that
regularly reviews research involving individuals with impaired decision-making capacity
should consider including as members (i) “professionals with the appropriate background,
knowledge and experience in working with individuals with impaired [decision-making]
capacity;” (ii) “representatives of [relevant] patient advocacy groups;” (iii) “experts in the
assessment of consent capacity; and/or” (iv) “experts on the scientific and ethical issues
relevant to studies involving vulnerable populations.” Office of Extramural Research,
Research Involving Individuals with Questionable Capacity to Consent: Points to
Consider, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH (Nov. 2009), http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/
questionablecapacity.htm. The Subcommittee for the Inclusion of Individuals with
Impaired Decision Making in Research (SIIIDR) of the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on
Human Research Protections (SACHRP) within the Office for Human Research
Protections (OHRP) similarly recommends that IRBs consider including as members
(i) “[p]atients, former patients, patient advocates or family members or others who can
represent the views and perspectives of the research participants;” (ii) “[i]ndividuals
with specific professional expertise related to the nature and consequences of
impaired consent capacity in the study population;” (iii) “[o]ther individuals who
can provide information relevant to the circumstances and context in which
the participant and LAR will be recruited (e.g., the long term care facility, critical
care unit, or mental health center);” and (iv) “[i]ndividuals with expertise regarding
applicable legal and regulatory requirements for consent to research by an LAR.” SEC’Y’S
ADVISORY COMM. ON HUMAN RESEARCH PROTECTIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE
SUBCOMMITTEE FOR THE INCLUSION OF INDIVIDUALS WITH IMPAIRED DECISION MAKING IN
RESEARCH (SIIIDR) 6–7 (2009), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/sachrp/
20090715letterattach.pdf.
64. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101–505 (declining to elaborate on the inclusion of such
individuals).
65. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.111(a)(4), 46.116.
66. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(c) (emphasis added).
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applicable law is generally thought to refer to state law67
although, as discussed in more detail at Part II.B below, state
law on this topic varies widely if it exists.
In light of the Common Rule’s lack of specific guidance
regarding research involving individuals with impaired decisionmaking capacity, a national commission and federal agencies have
issued nonbinding recommendations for the conduct of research
involving individuals with impaired decision-making capacity.68 In
December 1998, the Clinton Administration’s National Bioethics
Advisory Commission (NBAC) issued a special report entitled
“Research Involving Persons with Mental Disorders That May
69
Affect Decisionmaking Capacity” (Report). In the Report, the
NBAC recommended allowing minimal risk research that would
involve individuals with disorders that may affect decision-making
capacity if one of the following three requirements has been
satisfied: (i) the individual has the capacity to consent and does
consent to research participation; or, if the individual does not have
the capacity to consent, (ii) the individual executed an advance
research directive stating the individual’s desire to participate in
the research and the individual’s LAR consents to the individual’s
research participation; or (iii) the individual’s LAR consents to the
individual’s research participation.70 The NBAC further
recommended allowing greater than minimal risk research, but
only if the research offered the prospect of direct medical benefit to
the individual and, as in the case of minimal risk research, one of
the three requirements listed in the preceding sentence has been
satisfied.71 If the research protocol involved greater than minimal
risk but did not offer the prospect of direct medical benefit to the
individual, the NBAC would require either one of the first two
requirements to be satisfied or would require a special standing
panel with expertise on research involving individuals with mental
disorders that may affect decision-making capacity to approve the
individual’s research participation.72 Working groups in 200173 and
67. See, e.g., Request for Information and Comments on Research that Involves
Adult Individuals with Impaired Decision-Making Capacity, 72 Fed. Reg. 50,966, 50,969
(Sept. 5, 2007).
68. See infra text accompanying notes 69–87.
69. See generally NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, RESEARCH INVOLVING
PERSONS WITH MENTAL DISORDERS THAT MAY AFFECT DECISIONMAKING CAPACITY (1998).
70. Id. at 60 (Chapter 5, Recommendation 10).
71. Id. (Chapter 5, Recommendation 11).
72. Id. at 61 (Chapter 5, Recommendation 12).
73. HHS Working Grp. on the NBAC Report, Analysis and Proposed Actions
Regarding the NBAC Report: Research Involving Persons with Mental Disorders that May
Affect Decisionmaking Capacity, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES (Jan. 16, 2001),
http://aspe.hhs.gov/sp/nbac/a.shtml.
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200274 responded to the NBAC’s Report with additional
recommendations, including a proposal to adopt an additional
category of research (“minor increase over minimal risk”),
although neither the NBAC nor the working group
recommendations were adopted by a federal agency in formal
regulations.75
On September 5, 2007, HHS published in the Federal
Register a formal request for public comments addressing
whether additional guidance or a new subpart of the Common
Rule is needed to address research involving adults with
impaired decision-making capacity.76 Although the closing date
77
for the receipt of comments was January 14, 2008, HHS did not
issue any proposed or final regulations subsequent to its request
for comments.
Due to the lack of formal federal regulation, several federal
agencies and committees have released informal guidance
regarding the conduct of human subjects research involving
individuals with impaired decision-making capacity.78 In
November 2008, the Office for Human Research Protections
(OHRP) posted on its website answers to certain frequently
asked questions.79 The OHRP’s answers do not provide clear
guidance, especially for researchers involved in multi-site, multistate investigations. In response to one frequently asked question
(“Who can be a [LAR] for the purpose of providing consent on
behalf of a prospective subject?”), the OHRP explains that some
state laws identify those persons who are eligible to serve as a
LAR, while other state laws do not.80 According to the OHRP,
“IRBs may wish to consult with legal counsel when deciding who
81
can serve as [a] LAR for subjects of proposed research.” In
response to a second frequently asked question (“When may a
[LAR] provide consent on behalf of an adult with diminished
decision-making capacity?”), the OHRP explains that the
74. NAT’L HUMAN RESEARCH PROTECTIONS ADVISORY COMM. (NHRPAC), REPORT
NHRPAC ON INFORMED CONSENT AND THE DECISIONALLY IMPAIRED 1–4 (2002),
available at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/archive/nhrpac/documents/nhrpac10.pdf.
75. Tovino, supra note 8, at 40.
76. See Request for Information and Comments on Research that Involves Adult
Individuals with Impaired Decision-Making Capacity, 72 Fed. Reg. 50,966, 50,966, 50,968
(Sept. 5, 2007).
77. Id. at 50,966.
78. See infra text accompanying notes 79–87.
79. Office for Human Research Protections, Informed Consent—FAQs, U.S. DEP’T
HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, http://answers.hhs.gov/ohrp/categories/1566 (last visited Jan.
1, 2013).
80. Id.
81. Id.

FROM
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Common Rule “should be consulted in addition to the laws of the
jurisdiction in which the research is conducted.”82
In addition to the OHRP’s answers to frequently asked
questions, the Subcommittee for the Inclusion of Individuals with
Impaired Decision-Making in Research (SIIIDR) of the
Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Human Research Protections
(SACHRP) of the OHRP approved at meetings held on March 27,
2008, and March 4, 2009, recommendations regarding the
83
inclusion of individuals with impaired decision-making capacity.
When state or local law does not identify the individuals who are
eligible to serve as a surrogate, the SIIIDR recommended
obtaining consent from a priority-ordered list of individuals,
including
(a) a person designated by the individual, while retaining
the decisional capacity to do so, to make decisions for
him/her regarding participation in research;
(b) a person designated by the individual, while retaining
the decisional capacity to do so, to make decisions for
him/her regarding non-research health care decisions;
(c) the individual’s legal guardian with authority to make
health care decisions for him or her;
(d) the spouse, or if recognized by applicable law, the civil
union partner or domestic partner;
(e) an adult son or daughter;
(f) a parent;
(g) an adult brother or sister; [and]
(h) an adult who has exhibited special care and concern for
84
the prospective research participant.
In addition to the SIIIDR’s recommendations, the National
Institutes of Health (NIH) released in November 2009 certain
“Points to Consider” with respect to research involving
individuals with impaired decision-making capacity.85 In its
Points to Consider, the NIH recognized that many states do
not have laws specifically governing the consent-to-research
process and noted that stakeholders frequently rely on laws
86
governing consent to treatment. On this issue, the NIH
concludes that “IRBs may wish to consult with legal counsel

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON HUMAN RESEARCH PROTECTIONS, supra note 63, at 1.
Id. at 14.
Office of Extramural Research, supra note 63.
Id.
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when determining who can serve as [a] LAR for subjects of
proposed research.”87
Most recently, HHS, on July 26, 2011, issued its ANPR
“request[ing] comment on how . . . regulations for protecting
human subjects who participate in research might be modernized
88
and revised to be more effective.” Although the ANPR does not
specifically focus on the issues raised by research involving
individuals with impaired decision-making capacity, the ANPR
does recognize that the landscape of research activities has
changed dramatically since HHS adopted the Common Rule,89
that there has been a proliferation of research in the areas of
90
neurology, psychiatry, and the social and behavioral sciences,
and that new technologies, including functional magnetic
resonance imaging, have been employed to assist in answering
91
research questions. Given the rapid growth and expansion of
human subjects research, the ANPR proposes changes to seven
broad aspects of HHS’s current regulatory framework92 and
requests comment on seventy-four specific questions relating to
the regulation of human subjects research.93 One set of proposed
changes relates to “[i]mprovement of consent forms and the
94
consent process.” More specifically, Question #36 asks,
What additional information, if any, should be required by
the regulations to assure that consent forms appropriately
describe to subjects, in concise and clear language,
alternatives to participating in the research study and why
it may or may not be in their best interests to participate?
What modifications or deletions to the required elements
95
would be appropriate?
Question #38 further asks, “Should the regulations require
that, for certain types of studies, investigators assess how well
potential research subjects comprehend the information provided
96
to them before they are allowed to sign the consent form?”

87. Id.
88. Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research
Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg.
44,512, 44,512 (proposed July 26, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 46, 160, 164; 21
C.F.R. pts. 50, 56).
89. See id. at 44,513.
90. See id. at 44,512–13.
91. See id. at 44,513.
92. See id. at 44,514 (listing seven broad sets of proposed changes).
93. See id. at 44,517–29.
94. Id. at 44,514.
95. Id. at 44,523.
96. Id.
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Finally, Question #40 asks, “Would informed consent be
improved if the regulations included additional requirements
regarding the consent process, and if so, what should be
required?”97
As of this writing, HHS has yet to issue proposed or final
regulations in response to the comments received by HHS on the
98
ANPR. As a result, the conduct of human subjects research
involving adults with impaired decision-making capacity remains
legally and ethically murky, especially in the context of multisite, multi-state clinical trials.99
B. State Law
Although the federal government has yet to issue
regulations governing research involving individuals with
impaired decision-making capacity, some states do have relevant
laws, although these laws vary widely in their application, scope,
and regulation.100 Below, the laws of California, Missouri, and
New Jersey are used to illustrate the variety of state approaches
to the regulation of human subjects involving individuals with
impaired decision-making capacity.
California law is favorable for researchers who wish to
conduct research involving individuals with impaired decisionmaking capacity. California law allows a surrogate to consent to
research on behalf of an individual who is “unable to consent and
does not express dissent or resistance to participation,” even if
the research does not pose the prospect of direct medical benefit,
so long as the research “relate[s] to the cognitive impairment,
lack of capacity, or serious or life-threatening disease[ ] and
97. Id.
98. See Kristen Rosati, American Health Lawyers Association, The Tissue Issue:
Recent Developments in Biospecimen Research, Legal Issues Affecting Academic Medical
Centers and Other Teaching Institutions 5 (Jan. 26, 2012) (transcript available at
http://www.healthlawyers.org/Events/Programs/Materials/Documents/AMC12/papers/G_r
osati.pdf); see also Office for Human Research Protection, ANPRM Frequently Asked
Questions (FAQs) July 2011, U.S. DEPARTMENT HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES,
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/anprmqanda.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2013)
(asserting that the public will have an additional opportunity to comment before the
Common Rule is changed).
99. See, e.g., Kim et al., supra note 12, at 797 (“Despite a wave of initiatives in the
late 1990s to clarify policy, surrogate consent for research continues to be a murky legal
area and incapable subjects in the United States still lack clear regulatory protection.”);
SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON HUMAN RESEARCH PROTECTIONS, supra note 63, at 2.
100. See, e.g., Kim et al., supra note 12, at 798 (“Previous reviews of state laws and
regulations on proxy or surrogate consent for research have revealed tremendous
heterogeneity . . . .”); Saks et al., supra note 12, at 37–79 (surveying state laws governing
consent to research by legally authorized representatives on behalf of individuals with
impaired decision-making capacity).
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condition[ ]” of the individual.101 Under California law, the
surrogate shall have reasonable knowledge of the subject and
shall be selected from the following priority-ordered list of
persons:
(1) The [individual’s] agent pursuant to an advance health
care directive.
(2) The conservator or guardian of the person having the
authority to make health care decisions for the individual.
(3) The spouse of the [individual].
(4) [A domestic partner].
(5) An adult son or daughter of the person.
(6) A custodial parent of the person.
(7) Any adult brother or sister of the person.
(8) Any adult grandchild of the person.
(9) An available adult relative with the closest degree of
102
kinship to the person.
California research surrogates are required to base research
participation decisions on “the [individual’s] . . . health care
instructions, if any, and other wishes, to the extent known” by
the surrogate.103 “Otherwise, the surrogate . . . shall make the
104
decision in accordance with the [individual’s] best interests. “In
determining the [individual’s] best interests, the [surrogate] shall
consider the [individual’s] personal values and his or her best
estimation of what the [individual] would have chosen if he or
she were capable of making a decision” regarding research
participation.105 California law prohibits surrogates from
receiving compensation in exchange for consenting to an
individual’s research participation.106
Missouri law is much less descriptive (and permissive) than
California law. Missouri law prohibits certain public and private
mental health facilities and programs from conducting research
involving certain individuals with “intellectual disabilities,
developmental disabilities, mental illness, mental disorders or
alcohol or drug abuse unless such research is intended to
alleviate or prevent the disabling conditions or is reasonably

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24178(b)–(c) (West 2006).
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24178(c)(1)–(9) (West 2006).
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24178(g) (West 2006).
Id.
Id.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24178(i) (West 2006).
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expected to be of direct therapeutic benefit to the participants.”107
Missouri law does not address whether a surrogate may consent
to research on behalf of an individual with impaired decision108
making capacity.
New Jersey law requires research involving individuals with
“cognitive impairments, lack of capacity, or serious physical or
behavioral conditions and life-threatening diseases” to either
(i) offer the prospect of direct benefit to the person and maintain
an appropriate balance of research benefits and risks; or (ii) be
“likely to yield generalizable knowledge about the [person’s]
disorder or condition;” not be, by its nature, able to be conducted
without the participation of persons with impaired decisionmaking capacity; and “involve[ ] no more than a minor increase
109
over minimal risk.” A New Jersey research protocol that meets
one of these two sets of requirements may proceed if consent is
obtained from the individual or a surrogate,110 defined as
an authorized representative with reasonable knowledge of
the subject, who shall include any of the following persons, in the
following descending order of priority:
(1) the guardian of the subject who has the authority to
make health care decisions for the subject;
(2) the health care representative of the subject pursuant to
an advance directive for health care;
(3) the spouse or civil union partner, as applicable, of the
subject;
(4) the domestic partner . . . of the subject;
(5) an adult son or daughter of the subject;
(6) a custodial parent of the subject;
(7) an adult brother or sister of the subject;
(8) an adult grandchild of the subject;
(9) an available adult relative with the closest degree of
111
kinship to the subject.
Many states do not have laws governing the conduct of
human subjects research involving adults with impaired
112
decision-making capacity. In states that lack research-specific
107. MO. ANN. STAT. § 630.192 (West Supp. 2012).
108. See Susan E. Hickman et al., The POLST (Physician Orders for Life-Sustaining
Treatment) Paradigm to Improve End-of-Life Care: Potential State Legal Barriers to
Implementation, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 119, 126, 128, 133 (2008).
109. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:14–3(a)–(b) (West Supp. 2012).
110. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:14–4(a) (West Supp. 2012).
111. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:14–5(a)(1)–(9) (West Supp. 2012).
112. See, e.g., SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON HUMAN RESEARCH PROTECTIONS, supra
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laws, some researchers and research institutions rely on state
laws that govern consent to treatment, including laws like the
Texas, New York, and Washington laws discussed at Part III.B,
below.113 Moreover, it is the current policy of the OHRP to permit
a surrogate to consent to research if the surrogate is authorized
under state law to consent to the “procedures involved in the
114
research” under state laws governing consent to treatment. In
addition, the SIIIDR currently recommends, in the absence of a
specific law governing consent to research, that a surrogate who
is designated to make nonresearch health care decisions be
ranked second in the priority-ordered list of persons who are
eligible to make research participation decisions.115 In summary,
some researchers, some research institutions, the OHRP, the
SIIIDR, and other stakeholders believe that a surrogate who is
authorized to consent to treatment also should be permitted to
116
consent to an individual’s research participation. Part III, next,
examines federal and state legislation governing consent to
treatment. Then, Part IV argues that legislation governing
consent to treatment should not be used to answer researchrelated questions.
III. CONSENT-TO-TREATMENT LEGISLATION
In the clinical context, decision-making capacity refers to a
patient’s cognitive and emotional capacity to consider
information relating to the risks and benefits of a proposed
diagnostic examination, medical treatment, or surgical
procedure; the ability to make a decision to consent or refuse to
consent to such examination, treatment, or procedure; and the

note 63, at 2 (“Very few states specifically define legally authorized representatives
(LARs) for research, and most state’s laws are silent on the topic. Virtually no state laws
address the many ethical issues that arise when LARs are involved in research decisionmaking, leaving it to IRBs and institutions to invent solutions.”).
113. See, e.g., Office of Extramural Research, supra note 63 (“In most jurisdictions,
LAR appointment processes are not specific to the research setting and institutions rely
on the laws governing the use of LARs for clinical care.”).
114.
See, e.g., SEC ’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON H UMAN RESEARCH P ROTECTIONS,
supra note 63, at 13 (explaining, at Recommendation 8(b), that “[i]n states with laws
or regulations that address consent to treatment but do not specifically consider
consent to research, current OHRP interpretation permits consent to research by
individuals authorized under laws that allow consent to the ‘procedures involved in
the research’”).
115. Id. (recommending, at Recommendation 9(a)(ii)(b), in the absence of applicable state
law, that a person who is designated to make nonresearch health care decisions be ranked
second in the priority-ordered list of persons who are eligible to make research participation
decisions).
116. See id. at 13–14.
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ability to communicate that decision.117 Neurologists,
psychiatrists, geriatricians, and emergency medicine physicians,
among other clinicians, frequently treat patients with impaired
118
decision-making capacity. Some of these patients may be in a
coma or vegetative state and have no present decision-making
capacity.119 Other patients may have mild, moderate, or severe
neurological
disorders,
including
Parkinson’s
disease,
Alzheimer’s disease, and related dementias, which may restrict
their decision-making capacity.120 Still other patients may have

117. See, e.g., Gregory L. Larkin, Catherine A. Marco & Jean T. Abbott, Emergency
Determination of Decision-Making Capacity: Balancing Autonomy and Beneficence in the
Emergency Department, 8 ACADEMIC EMERGENCY MED. 282, 282 (2001) (“Decision-making
capacity includes the ability to receive, process, and understand information, the ability to
deliberate, the ability to make choices, and the ability to communicate those
preferences.”); Roy C. Martin et al., Medical Decision-Making Capacity in Cognitively
Impaired Parkinson’s Disease Patients Without Dementia, 23 MOVEMENT DISORDERS
1867, 1867 (2008) (defining medical decision-making capacity as the “cognitive and
emotional capacity to accept a proposed treatment, to refuse treatment, or to select among
treatment alternatives”).
118. See, e.g., Grant V. Chow et al., CURVES: A Mnemonic for Determining Medical
Decision-Making Capacity and Providing Emergency Treatment in the Acute Setting, 137
CHEST 421, 421–27 (2010) (addressing the evaluation of decision-making capacity in the
emergency context); Paul J. Eslinger, Neurological and Neuropsychological Bases of
Empathy, 39 EUR. NEURO. 193, 198 (1998) (remarking that neurologists and
neuropsychologists address a variety of issues, including cognitive impairment); Edmund
Howe, Ethical Aspects of Evaluating a Patient’s Mental Capacity, PSYCHIATRY, Jul. 2009,
at 15, 15 (noting that nonpsychiatrist physicians frequently consult with psychiatrists to
help make determinations regarding patients’ decision-making capacity); James M. Lai &
Jason Karlawish, Assessing the Capacity to Make Everyday Decisions: A Guide for
Clinicians and an Agenda for Future Research, 15 AM. J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY 101, 101
(2007) (noting that “[c]ompetency assessments are a common and necessary part of caring
for older patients with cognitive impairment[s]” and that geriatricians “face considerable
challenges in accurately and reliably identifying impaired competency”); id. at 103
(“[D]ischarge planners, case managers, and clinicians in hospitals, skilled nursing
facilities, and emergency departments [frequently] must decide whether a patient with
functional impairments is capable of making decisions.”).
119. See, e.g., Rowan H. Harwood, Robert Stewart & Peter Bartlett, Safeguarding the
Rights of Patients Who Lack Capacity in General Hospitals. Do the Bournewood Proposals
for England and Wales Help or Hinder?, 36 AGE & AGEING 120, 120 (2007) (“Many
people . . . in coma[s] are admitted to hospital[s], but lack the capacity to consent to
admission.”); Sheila A. M. McLean, Permanent Vegetative State and the Law, 71 J.
NEUROLOGY, NEUROSURGERY & PSYCHIATRY (NEUROLOGY IN PRACTICE SUPPLEMENT 1)
i26, i26 (2001) (noting that patients in a vegetative state lack capacity to consent to
treatment).
120. See, e.g., Jason Karlawish, Measuring Decision-Making Capacity in Cognitively
Impaired Individuals, 16 NEUROSIGNALS 91, 91–98 (2008) (reviewing studies of the
capacity to consent to treatment and research in the context of Alzheimer’s disease and
related dementias; and noting that individuals with Alzheimer’s disease and related
dementias frequently experience losses in decision-making capacity); Martin et al., supra
note 117, at 1867–74 (assessing decision-making capacity in patients with Parkinson’s
disease (PD) compared to healthy older adults; and suggesting that impairment in
decision-making capacity is already present in cognitively impaired PD patients without
dementia and that such impairment increases as these patients develop dementia);
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severe mental illnesses (such as schizophrenia with disturbance
of thought and perception) that limit their decision-making
capacity.121 Other patients may be experiencing a temporary loss
of decision-making capacity due to alcohol or drug intoxication or
mild traumatic brain injury, although they may be expected to
fully regain their decision-making capacity in the very near
122
future.
As these examples show, an individual’s decisionmaking capacity is not always conclusively present or absent but
occurs along a continuum that depends on the nature and
severity of the patient’s physical and mental health conditions
and the timing of the patient’s symptom occurrence.123
Neurological, psychiatric, and other health conditions do not
invariably impair an individual’s decision-making capacity, and
patient-specific assessments always are necessary.124
Jennifer Moye et al., Neuropsychological Predictors of Decision-Making Capacity Over 9
Months in Mild-to-Moderate Dementia, 21 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 78, 78–83 (2006)
(examining rates and neuropsychological predictors of decision-making capacity among
older adults with dementia; and finding that “[s]ome patients with mild-to-moderate
dementia develop clinically relevant impairment[s] of [decision-making] capacity within a
year”).
121. See, e.g., Delphine Capdevielle et al., Competence to Consent and Insight in
Schizophrenia: Is There an Association? A Pilot Study, 108 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 272, 272–
73 (2009) (“Data from studies of treatment decision processes by schizophrenic patients
have suggested that, as a group, these patients perform significantly worse on many
measures in comparison to those suffering from depression, other medical illnesses (such
as heart disease, HIV infection) or healthy control subjects.”); John H. Coverdale,
Laurence B. McCullough & Frank A. Chervenak, Assisted and Surrogate Decision Making
for Pregnant Patients Who Have Schizophrenia, 30 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 659, 659 (2004)
(explaining that “[s]chizophrenia can chronically and variably impair a woman’s decisions
concerning the management of [her] pregnancy,” including decisions regarding pregnancy
continuation).
122. See, e.g., Larkin, Marco & Abbott, supra note 117, at 283–84 (noting that
patients who are intoxicated present challenges in the context of determining decisionmaking capacity); Office of Extramural Research, supra note 63 (“For individuals with
conditions that bring about fluctuating levels of consent capacity, it is important to
consider the timing of the assessment and consent; it may make sense to time the initial
consent carefully to avoid periods when prospective subjects may be experiencing
heightened impairments, e.g., an individual with . . . acute drug intoxication.”); K.L.
Triebel et al., Treatment Consent Capacity in Patients with Traumatic Brain Injury
Across a Range of Injury Severity, 78 NEUROLOGY 1472, 1475 (2012).
123. Office of Extramural Research, supra note 63, at 2 (noting that decision-making
capacity for individuals with disabilities occurs along a continuum); Larkin, Marco &
Abbott, supra note 117, at 282 (“[Decision-making capacity] is a dynamic . . . and
changing talent; in practice it may be assessed on a non-dichotomous spectrum of
capacity, pertaining to the particular health care decisions at hand. Often, impairment is
situational; the same patient may be competent for one decision and not another,
depending on the gravity and consequences of the decision and the potential for harm.”).
124. See, e.g., Capdevielle et al., supra note 121, at 273 (explaining that “a subgroup
of patients with schizophrenia, even when acutely ill, performs no worse than the general
population” on measures of treatment decision processes (citations omitted)); The
MacArthur Treatment Competence Study: Executive Summary, MACARTHUR RES.
NETWORK ON MENTAL HEALTH & L. (May 2004), http://www.macarthur.virginia.edu/
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A. Federal Law
Other than general references to the doctrine of informed
consent to treatment and state law provisions regarding legal
representatives, federal law does not specifically address
impaired clinical decision-making capacity, first-person consent
to treatment, or surrogate consent to treatment.125 For example,
federal regulations that establish requirements applicable to
Medicare-participating hospitals simply provide,
The patient or his or her representative (as allowed under
State law) has the right to make informed decisions
regarding his or her care. The patient’s rights include being
informed of his or her health status, being involved in care
planning and treatment, and being able to request or refuse
126
treatment.
Federal regulations governing Medicare-participating hospices,
which provide palliative care to patients with terminal
conditions, similarly give hospice patients a general right to be
involved in developing their own hospice plans of care as well as
the right to refuse unwanted care.127 If a hospice patient has been
adjudged incompetent under state law by a court of proper
jurisdiction, federal regulations generally provide that “the rights
of the [hospice] patient are to be exercised by the person
appointed pursuant to state law to act on the patient’s behalf.”128
“If a state court has not adjudged a [hospice] patient
incompetent, [federal law provides that] any legal representative
designated by the patient in accordance with state law may
129
exercise the patient’s rights to the extent allowed by state law.”
Federal regulations governing Medicare-participating nursing
homes also are general in nature: “Unless adjudged incompetent
or otherwise found to be incapacitated under the laws of the
State, [patients have the right to] participate in planning care
and treatment or changes in care and treatment.”130

treatment.html (“Most patients hospitalized with serious mental illness have abilities
similar to persons without mental illness for making treatment decisions. Taken by itself,
mental illness does not invariably impair decision-making capacities. On the other hand,
a substantial percentage of hospitalized patients—up to half in the group with
schizophrenia when all four types of abilities are considered—show high levels of
impairment.” (emphasis omitted)).
125. See Saks et al., supra note 12, at 40, 52, 59–60.
126. 42 C.F.R. § 482.13(b)(2) (2010).
127. 42 C.F.R. § 418.52(c)(2)–(3).
128. 42 C.F.R. § 418.52(b)(2).
129. 42 C.F.R. § 418.52(b)(3).
130. 42 C.F.R. § 483.10(d)(3).

Do Not Delete

814

2/18/2013 4:08 PM

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[50:3

B. State Law
Unlike federal law, almost every state has enacted a law
that specifically defines decision-making capacity and incapacity,
establishes the process for obtaining the informed consent of
patients with capacity, establishes the process for obtaining
surrogate consent in the event a patient lacks capacity, identifies
the persons in priority order who are eligible to serve as a
surrogate for health care decisions, and identifies the standard
that a surrogate should use in deciding whether to consent to
medical treatment on behalf of a patient.131 Illustrative laws from
Texas, New York, and Washington are examined below. Although
these state laws vary in some important respects, they establish
relatively uniform consent-to-treatment policies and procedures
and may be used to illustrate the general approach that most
state legislatures have taken with respect to health care
decisions that involve individuals with impaired decision-making
capacity.
132
The Texas Consent to Medical Treatment Act (Texas Act)
defines decision-making capacity as “the ability to understand
and appreciate the nature and consequences of a decision
regarding medical treatment and the ability to reach an informed
133
decision in the matter” and incapacity as “lacking the ability,
based on reasonable medical judgment, to understand and
appreciate the nature and consequences of a treatment decision,
including the significant benefits and harms of and reasonable
alternatives to any proposed treatment decision.”134 A patient
with decision-making capacity has the right to consent or refuse
to consent to recommended medical treatments and surgical
procedures.135 If a patient is “comatose, incapacitated, or
otherwise mentally or physically incapable of communication”
and does not have an advance directive, then a competent adult
surrogate from a priority-ordered list “who has decision-making
capacity, [who] is available after a reasonably diligent inquiry,
and [who] is willing to consent to medical treatment on behalf of
the patient may consent to medical treatment on behalf of the
131. See infra text accompanying notes 132–172.
132. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 313.001 (West 2010).
133. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 313.002(3) (West 2010).
134. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 313.002(5) (West 2010).
135. 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 601.4(a)(1) (2012) (Tex. Med. Disclosure Panel, Informed
Consent) (codifying Texas’s standard disclosure and consent form, which contains the
following header: “You have the right, as a patient, to be informed about your condition
and the recommended surgical, medical, or diagnostic procedure to be used so that you
may make the decision whether or not to undergo the procedure after knowing the risks
and hazards involved” (emphasis omitted)).
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patient.”136 The following individuals may serve as a surrogate,
but only if an individual in a previous class is not available after
a reasonably diligent inquiry:
(1) the patient’s spouse;
(2) an adult child of the patient who has the waiver and
consent of all other qualified adult children of the patient to
act as the sole decision-maker;
(3) a majority of the patient’s reasonably available adult
children;
(4) the patient’s parents; or
(5) the individual clearly identified to act for the patient by
the patient before the patient became incapacitated, the
patient’s nearest living relative, or a member of the
137
clergy.
“Any dispute as to the right of a party to act as a surrogate
decision-maker must be resolved only by a court of record having
jurisdiction.”138 “Any medical treatment consented to [by a
surrogate] must be based on knowledge of what the patient
would desire, if known.”139 The Texas Act concludes by
prohibiting surrogates from consenting to certain health care
services and treatments, including voluntary inpatient mental
health services and electroconvulsive treatment.140
The New York Family Health Care Decision Act (New York
Act) defines decision-making capacity as “the ability to
understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of
proposed health care, including the benefits and risks of and
alternatives to proposed health care, and to reach an informed
141
decision.” A patient with decision-making capacity has the
right to consent or refuse to consent to recommended medical
treatments and surgical procedures.142 If a patient is determined

136. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 313.003(a), 313.004(a) (West Supp. 2012).
137. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 313.004(a)(1)–(5) (West 2010).
138. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 313.004(b) (West 2010).
139. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 313.004(c) (West 2010).
140. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 313.004(d)(1)–(2) (West 2010).
141. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994–a(5) (McKinney 2012).
142. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2504(1) (McKinney 2012) (“Any person who is eighteen
years of age or older . . . may give effective consent for medical, dental, health and
hospital services for himself or herself, and the consent of no other person shall be
necessary.”); see also Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914)
(“Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall
be done with his own body.”), abrogated on other grounds by Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3
(N.Y. 1957); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 71 (N.Y. 1981) (“In this State . . . there is no
statute which prohibits a patient from declining necessary medical treatment or a doctor
from honoring the patient’s decision. To the extent that existing statutory and decisional
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to lack decision-making capacity, a surrogate has the right to
consent or refuse to consent to recommended medical treatments
and surgical procedures on behalf of the patient.143 The following
individuals in the following priority order are eligible to serve as
a surrogate if an individual in a higher class is not reasonably
available, willing, and competent to act:
(a) A guardian authorized to [make health care decisions];
(b) The spouse, if not legally separated from the patient, or
the domestic partner;
(c) A son or daughter eighteen years of age or older;
(d) A parent;
(e) A brother or sister eighteen years of age or older;
144
(f) A close friend.
The standard for surrogate decision-making in New York is
“patient’s wishes” if known followed by “the patient’s best
145
interests.” More specifically, a “surrogate shall make health care
decisions: (i) in accordance with the patient’s wishes, including the
patient’s religious and moral beliefs; or (ii) if the patient’s wishes
are not reasonably known and cannot with reasonable diligence be
ascertained, in accordance with the patient’s best interests.”146
Factors to be considered by the surrogate in assessing the patient’s
best interests, if the patient’s wishes are not known, include
the dignity and uniqueness of every person; the possibility
and extent of preserving the patient’s life; the preservation,
improvement or restoration of the patient’s health or
functioning; the relief of the patient’s suffering; and any
medical condition and such other concerns and values as a
reasonable person in the patient’s circumstances would
147
wish to consider.
Unlike the Texas Act, the New York Act establishes a
procedure that is designed to secure a treatment decision in cases
law manifests the State’s interest on this subject, they consistently support the right of
the competent adult to make his own decision by imposing civil liability on those who
perform medical treatment without consent, although the treatment may be beneficial or
even necessary to preserve the patient’s life.”), superseded by statute, Surrogate’s Court
Procedure Act, N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT LAWS § 1750-b (McKinney 2011), as recognized
in In re M.B., 846 N.E.2d 794, 795–97 (N.Y. 2006) (granting a guardian full medical
decision-making power); Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77, 80–82 (N.Y. 1990) (“The
common law of this State established the right of a competent adult to determine the
course of his or her own medical treatment.”).
143. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994–d(3)(a)(i) (McKinney 2012).
144. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994–d(1)(a) to (f) (McKinney 2012).
145. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994–d(4)(a) (McKinney 2012).
146. Id.
147. Id.
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involving patients who lack capacity and have no family
members or friends who are eligible to serve as a surrogate.148
“The specific procedures to be followed depend on whether the
decision involves routine medical treatment [or] major medical
treatment” and the type of facility in which the treatment is to be
provided.149 If a hospital is unable to identify an individual who is
eligible to serve as a surrogate for a patient who lacks decisionmaking capacity, “the hospital [itself] shall identify, to the extent
reasonably possible, the patient’s wishes and preferences,
including the patient’s religious and moral beliefs, about pending
health care decisions.”150 In so doing, the hospital shall not be
influenced by its own financial interests or the financial interests
151
of any affiliated physician or other health care provider. With
respect to routine medical treatments, including the
administration of medications, the extraction of bodily fluids for
analysis, and dental care performed with a local anesthetic, the
New York Act authorizes the patient’s attending physician to
consent to such treatments if the physician believes the
treatments are in accordance with the patient’s wishes or, if the
patient’s wishes are unknown, the treatments are in the patient’s
best interests.152 With respect to major medical treatments
(including any procedures involving general anesthesia,
significant invasions of bodily integrity requiring an incision or
other significant invasions of bodily integrity, the use of physical
restraints, or the use of psychoactive medications), the New York
Act permits the attending physician to make a recommendation
for such treatments after consulting with hospital staff directly
responsible for the patient’s care.153 If one other physician
designated by the hospital or the patient’s residential care
facility independently determines that a major medical
treatment is appropriate, the treatment may be carried out at the
hospital.154
Unlike the Texas Act, the New York Act also requires notice
of the patient’s lack of capacity and of the surrogate’s
appointment to be given to certain parties, including
(a) the patient, where there is any indication of the
patient’s ability to comprehend the information; (b) to at

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994–g (McKinney 2012).
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994–g(2)(b) (McKinney 2012).
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994–g(1) (McKinney 2012).
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994–g(2)(b) (McKinney 2012).
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2994–d(4), 2994–g(2)(b), (3)(a)–(b) (McKinney 2012).
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994–g(4)(a) to (b)(i) (McKinney 2012).
See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994–g(4)(b)(ii) to (iii) (McKinney 2012).
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least one person on the surrogate list highest in order of
priority when persons in prior classes are not reasonably
available; [and] (c) if the patient was transferred [to the
hospital] from a mental hygiene facility, to the director of
the mental hygiene facility and to [its legal services
155
provider].

The New York Act also clarifies that, regardless of the
patient’s lack of decision-making capacity, the patient’s present
156
expressed wishes almost always govern. If a patient objects to
the determination of incapacity, the choice of surrogate, or to a
particular health care decision, for example, the patient’s
objection or decision prevails unless
(a) a court of competent jurisdiction has determined that
the patient lacks decision-making capacity or the patient is
or has been adjudged incompetent for all purposes and, in
the case of a patient’s objection to treatment, makes any
other finding required by law to authorize the treatment, or
(b) another legal basis exists for overriding the patient’s
157
decision.
The New York Act strictly regulates the process pursuant to
which a patient is determined to lack decision-making capacity.158
In general, an attending physician is required to “make an initial
determination that [the] . . . patient lacks decision-making
capacity to a reasonable degree of medical certainty.”159 The
attending physician’s initial determination “shall include an
assessment of the cause and extent of the patient’s incapacity
and the likelihood that the patient will regain decision-making
capacity.”160 If the attending physician has determined that a
patient lacks decision-making capacity due to mental illness,
then either (i) the attending physician must be licensed to
practice medicine in New York and must be board-certified (or
eligible for board certification) by the American Board of
Psychiatry and Neurology or the American Osteopathic Board of
Neurology and Psychiatry; or (ii) a second physician who meets
the requirements in the previous clause must also independently
determine that the patient lacks decision-making capacity.161 If
the attending physician has determined that a patient lacks
decision-making capacity due to an intellectual or developmental
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994–c(4)(a) to (c) (McKinney 2012).
See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994–c(6) (McKinney 2012).
Id.
See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994–c(2) to (3) (McKinney 2012).
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994–c(2) (McKinney 2012).
Id.
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994–c(3)(c)(i) (McKinney 2012).
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disability, then either (i) the attending physician must be
employed by one of a number of state schools for individuals with
developmental disabilities, or the physician must have “been
employed for a minimum of two years to render care and service
in a facility operated or licensed by the [New York State Office
for People With Developmental Disabilities],” or the physician
must have “been approved by the commissioner of mental
retardation and developmental disabilities in accordance with
[certain] regulations [that require] . . . specialized training or
three years experience in treating developmental disabilities”; or
(ii) another physician or clinical psychologist who meets the
requirements in the previous clause also must independently
determine that the patient lacks decision-making capacity.162
In two situations, the attending physician’s initial
determination must be subject to an independently made
163
concurring determination. The first situation involves a patient
who is receiving care in a residential health care facility, in
which case “a health or social services practitioner employed by
or otherwise formally affiliated with the facility must
independently determine whether [the] patient lacks decisionmaking capacity.”164 The second situation involves a patient who
is receiving care in a general hospital and with respect to whom a
surrogate is requesting the withholding or withdrawal of lifesustaining treatment, in which case “a health or social services
practitioner employed by or otherwise formally affiliated with the
facility must also independently determine whether [the] patient
lacks decision-making capacity.”165 If the health or social services
practitioner consulted “disagrees with the attending physician’s
determination, the matter shall be referred to [an] ethics review
166
committee if it cannot otherwise be resolved.”
Washington
State’s
surrogate
consent-to-treatment
procedures are considerably less detailed than those established
in New York. Washington’s informed consent law (Washington
Act) classifies an individual as incompetent for purposes of giving
informed consent for health care if the individual is “incompetent
by reason of mental illness, developmental disability, senility,
habitual drunkenness, excessive use of drugs, or other mental
incapacity, of either managing his or her property or caring for

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994–c(3)(c)(ii) (McKinney 2012).
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994–c(3)(a) to (b) (McKinney 2012).
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994–c(3)(b)(i) (McKinney 2012).
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994–c(3)(b)(ii) (McKinney 2012).
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994–c(3)(d) (McKinney 2012).
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himself or herself, or both.”167 A competent adult patient has the
right to consent or refuse to consent to recommended medical
treatments and surgical procedures.168 In situations involving an
incompetent adult patient, consent may be obtained from an
individual who is eligible to serve as a surrogate, according to the
following priority-ordered list:
(i) The appointed guardian of the patient, if any;
(ii) The individual, if any, to whom the patient has given a
durable power of attorney that encompasses the authority
to make health care decisions;
(iii) The patient’s spouse;
(iv) Children of the patient who are at least eighteen years
of age;
(v) Parents of the patient; and
169
(vi) Adult brothers and sisters of the patient.
If the health care provider seeking informed consent from a
surrogate “makes reasonable efforts to locate and secure
authorization from a [surrogate] in the first or succeeding class
and finds no such person available, authorization may be given
by any [surrogate] in the next class in the order of descending
priority.”170 Before consenting to proposed health care on behalf of
a patient, the Washington Act requires the surrogate to
determine in good faith that the patient, if competent, would
171
have consented to the proposed health care.
“If such a
determination cannot be made, the decision to consent to the
proposed health care may be made only after determining that
172
the proposed health care is in the patient’s best interests.”
IV. CONSENT-TO-TREATMENT LEGISLATION SHOULD NOT BE
USED TO ANSWER CONSENT-TO-RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The Texas, New York, and Washington Acts vary in some
important respects. The Acts use slightly different terminology
(i.e., “decision-making capacity” and “incapacity” in Texas,
“decision-making capacity” in New York, and “incompetency” in
Washington), for example. The Acts also define these terms
differently (i.e., “the ability to understand and appreciate the
167. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.88.010(1)(e) (West 2006 & Supp. 2012); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 7.70.065(1) (West 2007 & Supp. 2012).
168. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.050(1) (West 2007 & Supp. 2012).
169. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.065(1)(a)(i)–(vi) (West Supp. 2012).
170. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.065(1)(b) (West Supp. 2012).
171. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.065(1)(c) (West Supp. 2012).
172. Id.
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nature and consequences” of a health care decision in Texas and
New York and “mental illness, developmental disability, senility,
habitual drunkenness, excessive use of drugs, or other mental
incapacity” in Washington), and prioritize differently the
individuals who are eligible to serve as a surrogate (i.e., Texas
prioritizes traditional opposite-sex spouses whereas New York
and Washington place domestic partners on an equal footing with
spouses). The Texas Act provides only one standard for surrogate
decision-making, that is, what the patient would have desired, if
known. In New York and Washington, the patient’s best interests
may be used as a standard if the patient’s wishes are unknown.
The New York Act stringently regulates all aspects of the
surrogate consent-to-treatment process, including the credentials
and experience of the attending physician who makes the initial
determination that the patient lacks decision-making capacity,
the procedure by which a second health care provider makes an
independent concurring determination, the factors to be
considered in assessing whether a particular treatment is in a
patient’s best interests (if the patient’s wishes are unknown), and
the situations in which a physician is authorized to make a minor
or major medical treatment decision on behalf of a patient when
the patient lacks decision-making capacity and a legally
authorized surrogate does not exist. Texas and Washington, on
the other hand, very generally and without much detail regulate
the surrogate consent-to-treatment process.
From a bird’s eye view, however, all three state laws take
the same general approach to informed consent to treatment and
surrogate health care decision-making. That is, all three state
laws provide that (i) competent adult patients have the right to
consent or refuse to consent to recommended medical treatments
and surgical procedures; (ii) a surrogate may consent to
treatment on behalf of an incapacitated or incompetent adult
patient; (iii) the surrogate shall be selected from a priority list of
reasonably available competent adults; and (iv) the surrogate
shall consent to health care that the patient would have desired,
if that desire is known.
As discussed above, many states do not have laws governing
the conduct of human subjects research involving adults with
impaired decision-making capacity.173 In the absence of research-

173. See, e.g., SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON HUMAN RESEARCH PROTECTIONS, supra
note 63 (“Very few states specifically define legally authorized representatives (LARs) for
research, and most state’s laws are silent on the topic. Virtually no state laws address the
many ethical issues that arise when LARs are involved in research decision-making,
leaving it to IRBs and institutions to invent solutions.”).
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specific state laws, some researchers and research institutions
rely on state laws that were designed for the treatment setting,
and such reliance is supported by the OHRP.174 Contrary to this
position, I argue that (i) legislation governing consent to
treatment should not be used to answer research-related
questions; and (ii) HHS should adopt regulations specifically
governing human subjects research involving individuals with
impaired decision-making capacity that should be used to answer
all research-related questions. The reasons supporting these
arguments are set forth below.
First, treatment and research are intrinsically different
activities. Treatment may be defined as “the provision,
coordination, or management of health care and related services
175
by one or more health care providers” to a particular individual.
The definition of treatment is based on the concept of health care,
which has been defined as care, services, or procedures related to
the health of a particular individual.176 Health care is frequently
defined to include “[p]reventive, diagnostic, therapeutic,
rehabilitative, maintenance, or palliative care” that is provided to
a particular individual, as well as counseling, assessments, and
procedures that relate to the physical or mental condition or
functional status of a particular individual.177 Activities thus are
classified as treatment when they involve a health care service
provided by a health care provider that is tailored to the specific
preventive, diagnostic, therapeutic, or other health care needs of
a particular individual.178
174. See, e.g., Office of Extramural Research, supra note 63 (“In most
jurisdictions, LAR appointment processes are not specific to the research setting and
institutions rely on the laws governing the use of LARs for clinical care.”); SEC’ Y’S
ADVISORY COMM. ON H UMAN RESEARCH P ROTECTIONS , supra note 63 (explaining, at
Recommendation 8(b), that “[i]n states with laws or regulations that address consent
to treatment but do not specifically consider consent to research, current OHRP
interpretation permits consent to research by individuals authorized under laws that
allow consent to the ‘procedures involved in the research’”; and recommending, at
Recommendation 9(a)(ii)(b), in the absence of applicable state law, that a person who
is designated to make nonresearch health care decisions be ranked second in the
priority-ordered list of persons who are eligible to make research participation
decisions).
175. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2011) (definition of treatment set forth in the
HIPAA Privacy Rule).
176. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (definition of health care set forth in the HIPAA
Privacy Rule).
177. See, e.g., id.; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.001(10) (West Supp. 2012).
178. See, e.g., Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information,
65 Fed. Reg. 82,462, 82,626 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164) (“The
activities described by ‘treatment,’ therefore, all involve health care providers supplying
health care to a particular patient. While many activities beneficial to patients are offered
to entire populations or involve examining health information about entire populations,
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Research, on the other hand, is defined as “a systematic
investigation, including research development, testing and
evaluation, [that is] designed to develop or contribute to
179
Knowledge
is
considered
generalizable
knowledge.”
generalizable “when it can be applied to either a population
inside or outside of the population served by the [institution
180
conducting the research].” The purpose of research, then, is to
collect data that will lead to the creation of generalizable
knowledge that may result in the production of new therapies or
181
the improvement of existing therapies.
Compared side by side, the differences between treatment
and research become clear. First, the primary purpose of
treatment is to maintain or improve a particular patient’s health,
whereas the primary purpose of research is to gain knowledge
that will result in the creation of new treatments for future
182
patients. Second, physicians providing treatment frequently
adjust, substitute, and change therapies to meet the specific
183
health needs of particular patients. Investigators conducting
research, however, must follow approved research protocols and
are not permitted to adjust, substitute, or change the
experimental intervention (other than to allow the research

treatment involves health services provided by a health care provider and tailored to the
specific needs of an individual patient.”).
179. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d) (2011) (definition of research set forth in the
federal Common Rule); id. § 164.501 (definition of research set forth in the federal HIPAA
Privacy Rule).
180. See, e.g., Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information,
65 Fed. Reg. at 82,625; Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.005, 46.006 (2011).
181. See, e.g., Rebecca Dresser, The Ubiquity and Utility of the Therapeutic
Misconception, 19 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y, no. 2, at 271, 272 (2002) (“Although some research
participants may receive a health benefit, research is designed to generate data that could
lead to improved care for future patients.”); id. at 285 (“[I]nvestigators in the research
setting focus primarily on the need to obtain valid scientific data.”); Gail E. Henderson et
al., Clinical Trials and Medical Care: Defining the Therapeutic Misconception, 4 PLOS
MED. 1735, 1737 (2007) (“[T]here is consensus that the defining characteristic of research
is to create generalizable knowledge through answering a scientific question.”); id. at 1737
box 2 (“Clinical research is designed to produce generalizable knowledge and to answer
questions about the safety and efficacy of intervention(s) under study in order to
determine whether or not they may be useful for the care of future patients.”).
182. See, e.g., Dresser, supra note 181, at 285 (“[P]hysicians in the medical setting
seek solely to benefit the patient. In contrast, investigators in the research setting focus
primarily on the need to obtain valid scientific data.”); Belmont Report: Ethical Principles
and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192,
23,193 (Apr. 18, 1979) (distinguishing clinical practice from biomedical and behavioral
research).
183. See, e.g., Dresser, supra note 181, at 272 (“After treatment begins, medication
dosages may be increased if the patient fails to respond to the standard dosage, or
decreased if the patient experiences unwanted side effects. Patients who fail to improve
when taking one medication may be switched to another one.”).

Do Not Delete

824

2/18/2013 4:08 PM

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[50:3

participant to discontinue participation) in response to the wants
or needs of a particular participant.184 Third, a treating physician
has a primary duty of loyalty to his or her patients and is
charged with recommending treatments that the physician
believes are in each patient’s best interests.185 On the other hand,
researchers who do not also have a treatment relationship with
their research participants generally are not considered to have a
fiduciary or primary duty of loyalty to their research
participants.186 In theory, investigators design (and research
184. See, e.g., Paul S. Appelbaum, Charles W. Lidz, & Thomas Grisso, Therapeutic
Misconception in Clinical Research: Frequency and Risk Factors, IRB: ETHICS & HUM.
RES., Mar.–Apr. 2004, at 1, 1 (explaining that researchers are obligated “to protect the
validity of the data they generate [by] using . . . techniques [such] as randomized
assignment, placebo control groups, double-blind procedures, and fixed treatment
protocols, which often preclude personalized decisions from being made”); Paul S.
Appelbaum, Clarifying the Ethics of Clinical Research: A Path Toward Avoiding the
Therapeutic Misconception, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Spring 2002, at 22, 22 (explaining that “the
use of randomization, double-blind procedures, adherence to strict protocols, and
administration of placebos” in research studies “may be undertaken because they advance
the scientific validity of the research study, rather than because they serve the subject”);
Dresser supra note 181, at 272 (“Research methods that minimize ambiguity and bias in
data collection rule out the individualized approach that is the hallmark of clinical care.
In research, the intervention an individual receives is usually determined by random
assignment instead of a physician’s clinical judgment.”). Although research participants
have a legal right to withdraw from a research study at any time, they do not have the
right to adjust, substitute, or change an experimental intervention. See 45 C.F.R.
§ 46.116(a)(8) (2011).
185. See, e.g., TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 173 (5th ed. 2001) (explaining that the goal of medicine is to promote
the welfare of individual patients); COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AM.
MEDICAL ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION 374
(2010) (Opinion 10.015) (“The relationship between patient and physician is based on
trust and gives rise to physicians’ ethical obligations to place patients’ welfare above their
own self-interest and above obligations to other groups, and to advocate for their patients’
welfare. Within the patient-physician relationship, a physician is ethically required to use
sound medical judgment, holding the best interests of the patient as paramount.”); Nat’l
Library of Med., Greek Medicine: “I swear by Apollo Physician . . .”: Greek Medicine from
the Gods to
Galen,
NAT’L
INSTITUTES
HEALTH,
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/hmd/greek/greek_oath.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2013) (containing
the Hippocratic Oath, in which the physician pledges to “benefit [the physician’s] patients
according to [the physician’s] greatest ability and judgment”).
186. See, e.g., Suthers v. Amgen, Inc., 372 F. Supp.2d 416, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(refusing to find a fiduciary duty running from the sponsor of an independent research
study to the individuals who participated in the research); Greenberg v. Miami Children’s
Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp.2d 1064, 1072 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (refusing to find a
fiduciary duty running from Canavan disease researchers to their research participants);
Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 486 (Cal. 1990) (explaining that the
regents of the defendant university and its affiliated researchers were not physicians and
therefore did not owe the plaintiff patient a fiduciary duty); Dresser, supra note 181, at
292 (recommending that researchers explain to participants as part of the consent-toresearch process that the researchers’ primary loyalty is to future patients, not current
research participants). Notwithstanding these cases, some attorneys who represent
research participants continue to assert that the researcher–participant relationship
constitutes a fiduciary relationship. See, e.g., Alan C. Milstein, Research Malpractice and
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participants consent to participate in) research protocols with the
understanding of the differences between treatment and
research187 and with the knowledge that research participation
may not directly benefit the participant and may pose personal
health risks to the participant.188
Because treatment and research are intrinsically different
activities, I worry that allowing research institutions to rely on
legislation specifically designed and labeled for the treatment
setting to answer research-related questions could provide
continued legal and conceptual support for the therapeutic
misconception. First coined in 1982, “therapeutic misconception”
refers to the conflation of the goals of research with the goals of
189
With respect to research participants, a
clinical care.
the Issue of Incidental Findings, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 356, 358 (2008) (“Once the
research subject or the guardian for a minor subject signs the informed consent document,
a fiduciary relationship is formed between the PI [(Principal Investigator)] and the
research subject. The very nature of scientific research on human subjects creates special
relationships out of which fiduciary duties arise, similar to the physician/patient
relationship. The fiduciary relationship is formed not only by the informed consent
agreement between the parties, but also by the trust the subject necessarily places in the
researcher. In the context of human subjects research, a special relationship is created
between the human subject and those responsible for the design, approval, and
implementation of the experiment because the latter have a duty to protect human
subjects both under the Common Rule and common law.” (footnote omitted)). In addition,
some courts have found that researchers have “special relationships” with their research
participants that can give rise to unspecified tort-like duties. See, e.g., Grimes v. Kennedy
Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 846 (Md. 2001) (“[S]pecial relationships, out of which
duties arise, the breach of which can constitute negligence, can result from the
relationships between researcher and research subjects.”). See generally Stacey A. Tovino,
Incidental Findings: A Common Law Approach, 15 ACCOUNTABILITY IN RESEARCH 242,
250–54 (2008) (discussing the concepts of fiduciary duty and fiduciary relationships in the
context of neuroimaging research).
187. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(1) (2011) (requiring research participants to be
informed that they are participating in research); 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d) (defining research
as “a systematic investigation, including research development, testing and evaluation,
[that is] designed to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge”). As discussed in
more detail below, some research participants and researchers may be operating under a
therapeutic misconception. See infra text accompanying notes 189–198.
188. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(2) (2011) (requiring research participants to be
informed of reasonably foreseeable risks and discomforts before they may consent to
participate in the research).
189. See Appelbaum, Lidz & Grisso, supra note 184, at 1–6 (defining therapeutic
misconception with reference to research participants’ inappropriate assumption that
decisions about their care are being made solely with their benefit in mind; and reporting
data confirming that many research participants carry strong expectations that the
research, like the therapy they may have received previously, is designed and will be
executed in a manner of direct benefit to them); Appelbaum, supra note 184, at 22
(explaining that Appelbaum and colleagues first described the therapeutic misconception
phenomenon in 1982); Laura B. Dunn et al., Assessment of Therapeutic Misconception in
Older Schizophrenia Patients with a Brief Instrument, 163 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 500, 500
(2006) (defining the therapeutic misconception as the “conflation of the goals and
procedures of clinical research with those of usual clinical care”).
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therapeutic misconception is said to occur when a participant
transfers to the research setting the presumption that applies in
the clinical setting, that is, the presumption that the physician is
acting only with the patient’s best interests in mind.190 Studies of
the nature and frequency of the therapeutic misconception (and
of two related concepts, therapeutic misestimation and the
therapeutic optimism) among research participants show that
many research participants underappreciate research risks,
unrealistically hope for direct therapeutic benefit, fail to
recognize altruism and contribution to science as motives for
participating in research, and, more generally, conflate research
with clinical care.191 One of the most important concepts requiring
communication during the consent-to-research process is the

190. See Appelbaum, supra note 184, at 22; Henderson et al., supra note 181, at 1736
box 1 (“Therapeutic misconception exists when individuals do not understand that the
defining purpose of clinical research is to produce generalizable knowledge, regardless of
whether the subjects enrolled in the trial may potentially benefit from the intervention
under study or from other aspects of the clinical trial.”).
191. See, e.g., Appelbaum, Lidz & Grisso, supra note 184, at 1, 2–7 (reporting “the
first systematic attempt to assess the frequency of [therapeutic misconception] across a
range of clinical research projects”; finding that “31.1% . . . of participants expressed
inaccurate beliefs regarding the degree of individualization of their treatment . . . , while
51.1% . . . manifested an unreasonable belief in the nature or likelihood of benefit”; and
concluding that subjects frequently overestimate the likely benefits of entry into research
studies, underestimate risks, and conflate research with ordinary treatment); Christopher
Daugherty et al., Perceptions of Cancer Patients and Their Physicians Involved in Phase I
Trials, 13 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 1062, 1064–67 (1995) (reporting data showing that 85%
of thirty Phase I clinical trial research participants decided to participate in a Phase I
trial for reasons of possible therapeutic benefit while only 33% completely understood the
purpose of the trial in which they were participating; and concluding that patients who
participate in Phase I trials are strongly motivated by the hope of therapeutic benefit and
that altruistic feelings appear to have a limited and inconsequential role in motivating
patients to participate); Dunn et al., supra note 189, at 501–04 (examining the frequency
of a key aspect of therapeutic misconception in eighty-seven middle-age and older patients
with schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder; and concluding that patients with
schizophrenia show a substantial incidence of beliefs associated with therapeutic
misconception); Charles W. Lidz et al., Therapeutic Misconception and the Appreciation of
Risks in Clinical Trials, 58 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1689, 1689–97 (2004) (reporting results from
a study involving the interview of 155 research participants from forty different clinical
trials at two different U.S. medical centers; and concluding that research participants
often agree to participate in research “with only the most modest appreciation of the risks
and disadvantages of participation”); Robin E. Matutina, The Concept Analysis of
Therapeutic Misconception, 17 NURSE RESEARCHER, no. 4, 2010, at 83, 86–87 (identifying
elements present in therapeutic misconception, including patients confusing research
with treatment, believing they will receive physical benefit from study participation, and
failing to list altruism and contribution to science as motives for participating in the
study). Some authors classify a research participant’s underappreciation of research risks
and unrealistic hope for direct therapeutic benefit not as therapeutic misconception but,
instead, as therapeutic misestimation or therapeutic optimism. See, e.g., Daniel S.
Goldberg, Eschewing Definitions of the Therapeutic Misconception: A Family Resemblance
Analysis, 36 J. MED. & PHIL. 296, 299 (2011) (discussing therapeutic misconception,
therapeutic misestimation, and therapeutic optimism).
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difference between treatment and research and how a research
study is different than what the patient would ordinarily
encounter in the clinical setting.192 Failure to distinguish research
from ordinary treatment and failure to understand the
consequences of research participation (including the likelihood
and nature of any risks and the potential lack of any direct
193
medical benefit) can undermine true informed consent.
Part of the problem is that researchers themselves may be
194
operating under a therapeutic misconception. Several studies,
case reports, and histories suggest that some researchers (i) view
the purpose of clinical trials as benefiting individual research
participants rather than creating generalizable knowledge for the
purpose of advancing future therapy;195 (ii) have an unreasonable
expectation of their participants’ direct therapeutic benefit;196 and
192. See Appelbaum, supra note 184, at 23; Henderson et al., supra note 181, at 1735
(“Ethicists have argued that informed consent to participate in research should include
clarification of the differences between [the] two activities [of treatment and research].”).
193. See, e.g., Appelbaum, Lidz & Grisso, supra note 184, at 2 (“[Therapeutic
misconception] may constitute a major obstacle to meaningful decision-making.”);
Dresser, supra note 181, at 285 (“The therapeutic misconception conflicts with the longstanding and widely accepted research-ethics principle of respect for persons. This
principle holds that morally permissible research takes place only when the studied
individuals have made an informed and voluntary choice to participate. Patients who
enroll in research without understanding how such participation will change the
management of their condition are insufficiently informed. Such individuals have not
given researchers valid permission to elevate scientific considerations above the
individuals’ own best interests.”); Dunn et al., supra note 189, at 500 (explaining that the
therapeutic misconception may impede informed consent); Lidz et al., supra note 191, at
1689 (“[F]ailure to distinguish the consequences of research participation from receiving
ordinary treatment may seriously undermine the informed consent of research subjects.”).
194. See, e.g., Appelbaum, supra note 184, at 23 (“If we are to disabuse research
subjects of unrealistic beliefs regarding the therapeutic benefits of participating in
studies, surely we must first take the same step with the researchers
themselves. . . . Confused investigators generate confused subjects; the latter then enroll
in studies, seeking therapeutic benefits that are almost certain not to accrue.”); Goldberg,
supra note 191, at 308–13 (examining why researchers also may be operating under a
therapeutic misconception).
195. See, e.g., Steven Joffe & Jane C. Weeks, Views of American Oncologists About
the Purposes of Clinical Trials, 94 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 1847, 1851 (2002) (reporting the
results of a survey studying American cancer specialists about their beliefs regarding
clinical trials; concluding that many respondents viewed the main societal purpose of
clinical trials as benefiting the participants rather than as creating generalizable
knowledge to advance future therapy; and opining that this view conflicts with
established principles of research ethics).
196. See, e.g., Dresser, supra note 181, at 277 (“[S]tudies find that physicians are at
times unrealistically optimistic about an experimental intervention’s prospects.”);
Goldberg, supra note 191, at 308 (maintaining that some perpetrators of human subjects
research abuses “unreasonably believed the persons they experimented on would receive
direct benefit”); Gail E. Henderson et al., Uncertain Benefit: Investigators’ Views and
Communications in Early Phase Gene Transfer Trials, 10 MOLECULAR THERAPY 225, 226–
27 (2004) (finding that 46% (eighteen of the thirty-nine) investigators studied in early
phase gene transfer research expected subjects in the trials to receive direct benefit).
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(iii) use a patient’s or surrogate’s hope of cure or desire to receive
treatment as leverage to obtain their consent to research
participation.197 As one way of ensuring that research
participants do not consent to research while under the guise of a
therapeutic misconception, bioethicists and attorneys routinely
recommend that researchers and their coordinators not
personally harbor unrealistic beliefs about the benefits and risks
associated with particular research protocols and be capable of
appropriately distinguishing between evidence-based medicine
and experimental research in oral and written communications
with their potential research participants.198
Notwithstanding the bioethics and legal communities’
widespread recognition of and concern regarding the therapeutic
misconception, researchers, participants, and others continue to
199
200
operate under its shroud. If, by federal agency recommendation,
197. See, e.g., Paul A. Lombardo, Dwarves: Uninformed Consent and Eugenic
Research, 25 ETHICS & MED. 149, 149–50, 155–57, 159 (2009) (examining the plan of
American biologist and eugenics leader Charles B. Davenport to conduct an experimental
castration on a boy whom Davenport referred to as a “Mongoloid dwarf”; noting
Davenport’s reliance on a speculative therapeutic justification (that of easing the boy’s
“marked eroticism”) to justify the experiment and elicit consent from the boy’s mother;
explaining, “[Davenport’s] desire to use the excuse of therapeutic prerogative as the mask
behind which to hide his true goals—suggesting that surgery was for the patient’s benefit
rather than primarily to aid scientific discovery—indicates his sensitivity to the potential
that others would find such research both legally and ethically problematic”; and
concluding: “The researchers used the patient’s (or their surrogate decisionmaker’s) hope
of cure, or at least acquiescence to treatment, as leverage for advancing an agenda more
concerned with research than therapy”).
198. See, e.g., Jessica Wilen Berg, Legal and Ethical Complexities of Consent with
Cognitively Impaired Research Subjects: Proposed Guidelines, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 18,
18 (1996) (remarking that judges and lawyers seek to ensure that research subjects’
rights are protected); Dresser, supra note 181, at 277 (reporting empirical evidence
showing that “patients . . . form impressions about research studies based on discussions
with their personal physicians” and may decide to participate in research very quickly if
the physician urges participation); id. at 279 (referencing studies finding that research
coordinators conflated research with treatment); Mildred K. Cho & David Magnus,
Therapeutic Misconception and Stem Cell Research, NATURE REP. (Sept. 27, 2007),
http://www.nature.com/stemcells/2007/0709/070927/full/stemcells.2007.88.html
(referencing studies suggesting that “researchers can and should guard against
encouraging the therapeutic misconception, both in informed-consent forms and in
publications”; and concluding, in the context of stem cell research, that, “although all
researchers working with human subjects must guard against the therapeutic
misconception, stem cell scientists have a particularly heavy burden to make sure that
research donors and research subjects alike understand that, so far, experiments are
exactly that”).
199. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 198, at 19 (discussing concerns in the legal
community); Dresser, supra note 181, at 276 (“Despite widespread recognition of and
expressed concern about the therapeutic misconception, investigators and physicians
continue to promote it.”); id. at 290 (“Despite periodic expressions of concern, the research
system and the larger society continue to tolerate—and to promote—the conflation of
research and therapy.”); id. at 294 (“Until now, beneficiaries of the therapeutic
misconception have preferred to maintain the status quo.”); Lombardo, supra note 197, at
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we allow researchers to rely on legislation that by title and content
applies to only the treatment setting, we may be continuing to blur
important distinctions between treatment and research,201 at least
at the legal level. Of course, state legislatures could quickly fix part
of the problem by renaming202 and amending203 their consent-totreatment statutes to clarify that they also apply in the research
setting. The more important substantive question is whether the
content of state legislation governing consent to treatment is
appropriate for the research setting. I argue that it is not for at least
two different reasons.
159 (“Both informed consent and the therapeutic misconception remain major issues in
research ethics today.”).
200. See supra text accompanying notes 114–116.
201. See Appelbaum, supra note 184, at 23 (expressing similar concerns).
202. For example, the Texas Act could be renamed the Texas Consent to Medical
Treatment and Research Participation Act, the New York Act could be renamed the New
York Family Health Care and Research Participation Act, and the Washington Act could
be renamed the Washington Informed Consent to Treatment and Research Participation
Act.
203. By further example, the Texas Act could be amended with italicized additions
and stricken deletions, as follows:
Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 313.004.
Consent for Medical Treatment and Research Participation.
(a) If an adult individual patient . . . in a hospital or nursing home . . . is
comatose, incapacitated, or otherwise mentally or physically incapable of
communication, an adult surrogate from the following list, in order of
priority, who has decision-making capacity, is available after a reasonably
diligent inquiry, and is willing to consent to medical treatment or research
participation on behalf of the individual patient may consent to medical
treatment or research participation on behalf of the individual patient:
(1) the individual’s patient’s spouse;
(2) an adult child of the individual patient who has the waiver and
consent of all other qualified adult children of the individual patient to
act as the sole treatment or research participation decision-maker;
(3) a majority of the individual’s patient’s reasonably available adult
children;
(4) the individual’s patient’s parents; or
(5) the person individual clearly identified to act for the individual
patient by the individual patient before the individual patient became
incapacitated, the individual’s patient’s nearest living relative, or a
member of the clergy.
(b) Any dispute as to the right of a party to act as a surrogate decisionmaker may be resolved only by a court of record having jurisdiction under
Chapter V, Texas Probate Code.
(c) Any medical treatment or research protocol consented to under
Subsection (a) must be based on knowledge of what the individual patient
would desire, if known.
(d) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, a surrogate
decision-maker may not consent to:
(1) voluntary inpatient mental health services;
(2) standard or experimental electro-convulsive treatment; or
(3) the appointment of another surrogate decision-maker.
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First, many state consent-to-treatment laws contain a
“patient’s wishes if known” followed by “the patient’s best
204
interests” standard for surrogate decision-making. Under the
New York Act, for example, surrogates are required to make
health care decisions “(i) in accordance with the patient’s wishes,
including the patient’s religious and moral beliefs; or (ii) if the
patient’s wishes are not reasonably known and cannot with
reasonable diligence be ascertained, in accordance with the
patient’s best interests.”205 Many commentators believe that the
first standard, the “patient’s wishes if known” standard, works
very well in the treatment setting and may also be used in the
research setting without violating ethical and legal principles.
That is, if an adult individual with decision-making capacity is
informed of the nature of a particular research study and
comprehends the known (and appreciates the existence of
unknown) risks and benefits of the study, and expresses by clear
and convincing evidence the individual’s wish to be enrolled in
the study in the event the individual loses decision-making
capacity, many ethicists and attorneys would be comfortable with
allowing the individual to be enrolled in the study if the study
minimizes research risks and satisfies other federal
requirements relating to human subjects research.206 The ethical
principle of “respect for autonomy” and the legal principle of
“self-determination” suggest that we should respect the
competent individual’s informed decision to participate in the
study.207

204. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994–d(4)(a) (McKinney 2012).
205. Id.
206. See, e.g., Palaniappan Muthappan, Heidi Forster & David Wendler, Research
Advance Directives: Protection or Obstacle? 162 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 2389, 2390 (2005)
(“Adults who are unable to provide informed consent should be enrolled in clinical
research only with sufficient evidence that such enrollment is consistent with their
competent preferences.”); Saks et al., supra note 12, at 66 (“[O]ne can imagine many cases
of research with decisionally impaired people that would not be controversial to most
people. Take the case, for example, of a person giving an advance directive consenting to a
particular research study, prior to becoming decisionally impaired. Assume that the study
involves known procedures and risks that have not changed over time and that the
subject clearly understood when giving the advance consent.”).
207. See, e.g., Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of
Human Subjects of Research, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192, 23,193 (Apr. 18, 1979) (“An
autonomous person is an individual capable of deliberation about personal goals and of
acting under the direction of such deliberation. To respect autonomy is to give weight to
autonomous persons’ considered opinions and choices while refraining from obstructing
their actions unless they are clearly detrimental to others. To show lack of respect for an
autonomous agent is to repudiate that person’s considered judgments [or] to deny an
individual the freedom to act on those considered judgments . . . .”); BEAUCHAMP &
CHILDRESS, supra note 185, at 58 (“The autonomous individual acts freely in accordance
with a self-chosen plan . . . .”).
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The contingent standard, the “patient’s best interests”
standard, also is believed to work well in the treatment setting
because physicians have both an ethical and legal obligation to
place their patients’ welfare above their own financial, economic,
and other self-interests and to hold the best interests of their
208
patients as paramount. Even in situations in which a patient
lacks decision-making capacity, a surrogate who consents to a
treatment on behalf of the patient should be consenting to a
treatment that a physician is recommending because the
physician believes the treatment is in the patient’s best
interests.209 Of course, the “patient’s best interests” standard does
not always work perfectly in the treatment setting. A careless
physician may negligently recommend, order, or perform a
particular medical treatment, for example, and the surrogate
may have relied on the physician’s treatment recommendation in
making a decision to consent to the treatment on behalf of the
patient. Or, a surrogate who stands to inherit a patient’s estate
or otherwise has a conflict of interest may refuse to consent to a
physician-recommended treatment that likely would have been
in the patient’s best physical and mental health interests. In
general, however, the “patient’s best interest” standard is
believed to work well in the treatment setting because physicians
have an ethical and legal duty to serve their patients’ best
interests and most surrogates do in fact make health care
decisions that they believe are in their patients’ best interests.210
The problem is that the “best interests” standard may not
work as routinely well in the research setting. Many biomedical
and behavioral investigations are designed to study the safety
211
and efficacy of experimental interventions. If an experimental
intervention, such as an experimental new drug for Alzheimer’s
208. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
210. David I. Shalowitz, Elizabeth Garrett-Mayer & David Wendler, The Accuracy of
Surrogate Decision Makers: A Systematic Review, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 493, 495
(2006) (detailing the results of studies that show surrogates correctly predicted patients’
preferred treatment with 68% accuracy).
211. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a) (2010) (describing Phase I research studies,
which are designed “to determine the metabolism and pharmacologic actions of [an
experimental] drug in humans, the side effects associated with increasing doses, and, if
possible, to gain early evidence on effectiveness”); 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(b) (describing Phase
II research studies, which are designed “to evaluate the effectiveness of [a] drug for a
particular indication or indications in patients with the disease or condition under study
and to determine the common short-term side effects and risks associated with the drug”);
and 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(c) (describing Phase III research studies, which are designed “to
gather the additional information about effectiveness and safety that is needed to
evaluate the overall benefit-risk relationship of [a] drug and to provide an adequate basis
for physician labeling”).
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disease or schizophrenia, has not yet been proven safe (and its
efficacy has yet to be studied), an individual who is enrolled in a
protocol studying the intervention’s safety may be subject to
significant physical and emotional health risks and may not
enjoy any direct therapeutic benefit.212 In the typical Phase I drug
trial, for example, researchers assess a drug’s safety, tolerability,
213
pharmacokinetics, and pharmacodynamics. Because only a very
small percentage of individuals respond positively to
experimental drugs tested in Phase I trials and because the
chance of death and the likelihood of other side effects may be
comparable to the chance of direct benefit, Phase I trials may not
confer any aggregate survival advantage for research
participants.214 Stated another way, it is very likely that research
participation in a Phase I trial will not be in an individual
research participant’s best physical and mental health
215
interests. Of course, not all research studies are Phase I trials
and some research studies do happen to benefit individuals who
have the health condition under investigation. Generally
speaking, however, many research studies are not in the best
physical or mental health interests of their participants (even if
it is in the researcher’s best interests to enroll the participants in
the study).216 Stated slightly differently, the physician’s,

212. See, e.g., Complaint—Civil Action, Gelsinger v. Trustees of the Univ. of Penn.,
(Pa. C. 2000), available at http://www.sskrplaw.com/files/gelsinger_complaint.pdf (lawsuit
filed by parents on behalf of their eighteen-year-old son, Jesse Gelsinger, who died
following his participation in Phase I gene research conducted at the University of
Pennsylvania that was not expected to have any direct therapeutic benefit and that had
killed monkeys during animal testing).
213. See, e.g., CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: ESTIMATING THE MAXIMUM SAFE STARTING
DOSE IN INITIAL CLINICAL TRIALS FOR THERAPEUTICS IN ADULT HEALTHY VOLUNTEERS 2
(2005) (describing the objectives of Phase I drug trials as assessment of the experimental
therapeutic’s tolerability, pharmacodynamics, and pharmacokinetics).
214. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 191, at 305 (discussing the therapeutic misconception
in the context of Phase I oncology trials); Matthew Miller, Phase I Cancer Trials: A Collusion of
Misunderstanding, HASTINGS CENTER REP., July–Aug. 2000, at 34, 35; Dresser, supra note 181,
at 275 (“Phase I chemotherapy trials have very little chance of helping trial participants to live
longer or feel better.”); Robert Steinbrook, The Gelsinger Case, in THE OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF
CLINICAL RESEARCH ETHICS 110, 111–12, 114–15 (Ezekial J. Emanuel et al. eds., 2008)
(discussing the Gelsinger lawsuit, which was settled by the University of Pennsylvania and
involved a Phase I gene study that not only did not confer a survival advantage to the
plaintiffs’ decedent son but also was dangerous to research participants).
215. Cf. Kim et al., supra note 12, at 801 (“The . . . standard of ‘best interests’ of the
potential subject is problematic for research consent, since the point of research
participation may not be for direct health benefits to the subject, although it is possible
that a promising treatment may be available only within a research protocol and
therefore the best-interest standard could at times be relevant.”).
216. See Miller, supra note 214, at 36–37 (describing the difficulty in reconciling the
research trials’ methods with the patients’ expectations during patient enrollment).
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surrogate’s, and patient’s interests usually are aligned in the
treatment setting. In the research setting, the researcher has a
duty to generate data that will contribute to generalizable
knowledge, while the surrogate has a duty to carry out the
prospective participant’s wishes or do what is in the participant’s
best interests. Many times, a researcher’s need to enroll
participants in a study will conflict with the surrogate’s
obligation to do what is in the individual’s best physical and
mental health interests.217
This problem is compounded by the fact that legislation
governing consent to treatment is drafted in a manner that
suggests that physician-recommended treatments usually are in
a patient’s best physical and mental health interests, which fails
to take into account the conflicts of interest that exist in the
research context. Under the New York Act, for example, factors
to be considered by the surrogate in assessing the patient’s best
interests include “the possibility and extent of preserving the
patient’s life; the preservation, improvement or restoration of the
patient’s health or functioning; [and] the relief of the patient’s
suffering.”218 These factors focus overwhelmingly on the prospect
of therapeutic benefit. In order to be appropriate for the research
setting, consent-to-treatment legislation would have to require
consideration of the known, suspected, and unknown physical
and emotional health risks associated with the experimental
intervention and the individual’s or surrogate’s comprehension of
the likelihood that the intervention will yield no therapeutic
benefit.
So far, this Part has argued that treatment and research are
intrinsically different activities, that government-supported
reliance on legislation governing consent to treatment to answer
research-related questions could provide continued legal and
conceptual support for the therapeutic misconception, and that
the content of legislation governing consent to treatment may be
inappropriate for research-related questions because researchers
have a duty to collect data and report research results, not to
hold the best physical and mental health interests of their
participants as paramount. Rather than relabeling legislation
governing consent to treatment in an attempt to make it
219
applicable to both the treatment and research settings, HHS
should enact stand-alone consent-to-research regulations that
specifically address the issues posed by research involving adults
217.
218.
219.

See id.
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994–d(4)(a) (McKinney 2012).
See supra notes 202–203.
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with impaired decision-making capacity and that take into
account the potential conflicts of interest between and among
researchers, surrogates, and participants. That is, HHS should
adopt regulations that require researchers to recognize and
convey to surrogates of prospective research participants who
have impaired decision-making capacity (i) the conceptual
distinctions between treatment and research; (ii) the specific
differences between individualized, adaptable treatment methods
and protocol-driven double-blind, randomized, placebo-controlled
research procedures; (iii) the known, suspected, and unknown
risks associated with the research study;220 and (iv) the likelihood
that the research participant may not directly benefit from the
221
Why? Because federal and state regulations and
research.
statutes are part and parcel of the public discourse about human
subjects research ethics, and they must convey a more balanced
and nuanced understanding of the possible risks and benefits of
research participation.222
My proposal for research-specific regulations is supported by
other substantive areas of health law that distinguish between
treatment and research and establish more stringent
requirements for research. In the context of health information
confidentiality, for example, the federal Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule
establishes the level of individual permission that is required
before a covered entity may use or disclose the individual’s
protected health information (PHI) for a variety of activities,
223
224
and research.
Although the HIPAA
including treatment
Privacy Rule allows a covered entity to freely use and disclose an
220. See, e.g., Henderson et al., supra note 181, at 1737 box 2 (“For intervention(s)
under study in clinical research, there often is less knowledge and more uncertainty about
the risks and benefits to a population of trial participants than there is when a doctor
offers a patient standard interventions.”); Lidz, supra note 191, at 1691.
221. See, e.g., Dresser, supra note 181, at 285 (“[H]ardly anyone acknowledges the
relative scarcity of cases in which clinical-trial participants have their lives significantly
extended or improved.”); id. at 291 (recommending that researchers prepare one-page
forms that highlight the differences between research and treatment and that emphasize
participants’ low chance of directly benefiting from research participation); id. at 292
(recommending that researchers provide participants with information regarding
randomization, placebo groups, and other research methods; explain how study
participants are treated differently than patients; and emphasize the nature and extent of
the differences between treatment and research); id. at 293 (“[R]esearchers must give
patients stark, bold, and dramatic signs that research is different than clinical care.”).
222. See id. at 293 (“[P]ublic discourse about research must convey a more sober and
qualified picture of what patients can gain and lose from enrolling in research studies.”).
223. 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(a), (c)(1)–(2) (2011).
224. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i) (establishing the level of individual permission that is
required before a covered entity may use or disclose the individual’s PHI for purposes of
research).
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individual’s PHI for the covered entity’s own treatment
activities225 and to freely disclose an individual’s PHI to another
health care provider for the recipient provider’s treatment
226
activities without obtaining the individual’s prior authorization
for the treatment use or disclosure, the HIPAA Privacy Rule
regulates research activities much more stringently. When an
individual’s PHI will be used or disclosed for a research activity,
the HIPAA Privacy Rule requires the individual to execute a
prior written authorization form227 containing certain core
228
229
elements and required statements, unless an institutional
review board or a privacy board has approved a waiver of the
otherwise required authorization form,230 or the individual is
231
deceased, or the information will be used as part of a records
review that is preparatory to research,232 or the information
requested is a limited data set and the researcher has agreed to
sign a data use agreement pursuant to which the researcher
agrees to protect the confidentiality of the PHI.233 According to
HHS, the reason for the more stringent regulation of research in
the context of health information confidentiality is that
individuals expect, when they request treatment from a health
care provider, that their information will be used and disclosed
for reasons relating to that treatment,234 but not for research
purposes.235 The requirement for prior written authorization in
225. 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(c)(1).
226. 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(c)(2).
227. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed.
Reg. 82,462, 82,520 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified in 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164) (“In the final rule,
we . . . require covered entities to obtain an authorization for the use or disclosure of
protected health information the covered entity creates for the purpose of research that
includes treatment of individuals, except as otherwise permitted by § 164.512(i).”).
228. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c)(1) (listing the core elements).
229. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c)(2) (listing the required statements).
230. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i)(1)(i).
231. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i)(1)(iii).
232. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i)(1)(ii).
233. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e)(1), (e)(3)–(4).
234. See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., USES
AND DISCLOSURES FOR TREATMENT, PAYMENT, AND HEALTH CARE OPERATIONS 1 (2003),
available
at
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/coveredentities/
sharingfortpo.pdf (“Many individuals expect that their health information will be used
and disclosed as necessary to treat them . . . . To avoid interfering with an individual’s
access to quality health care or the efficient payment for such health care, the Privacy
Rule permits a covered entity to use and disclose protected health information, with
certain limits and protections, for treatment . . . .”).
235. See, e.g., Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information,
64 Fed. Reg. 59,918, 59,952 (proposed Nov. 3, 1999) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 164.508
(2011)) (“Authorization would be required for these [nonhealth-care-related] uses and
disclosures because individuals probably do not envision that the information they
provide when getting health care would be disclosed for such unrelated purposes.”).
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the context of research is designed to alert the individual that a
covered entity is seeking to use or disclose the individual’s PHI
for a research activity and to allow the individual to control the
research-related information use or disclosure, including by
allowing the individual to refuse to authorize the information use
or disclosure.236
Further, in the context of health insurance, both public
health care programs and private health plans distinguish
evidence-based medical treatments, on the one hand, and
biomedical and behavioral experiments on the other. Through
federal statutes and regulations governing the Medicare and
Medicaid programs, HHS clarifies that such programs will cover
health care items and services that are medically necessary, but
not items and services that are not reasonable and necessary for
the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury,237 including some
experimental and investigative treatments.238 In their plan
documents, private health plans also distinguish evidence-based
239
medical treatments and medical experiments. For example,
236. See, e.g., id. (“Further, once a patient’s protected health information is disclosed
outside of the treatment and payment arena, it could be very difficult for the individual to
determine what additional entities have seen, used and further disclosed the information.
Requiring an authorization from the patient for such uses and disclosures would enhance
individuals’ control over their protected health information.”).
237. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395n(a)(2) (2006 & Supp. III 2010) (requiring a physician
to certify the medical necessity of home health services, medical and other health services,
outpatient physical therapy services, outpatient occupational therapy services, outpatient
speech pathology services, comprehensive outpatient rehabilitation facility services, and
partial hospitalization services before Medicare will pay for such services); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395y(a)(1)(A) (2006 & Supp. III 2010) (allowing Medicare Part A and B payments to be
made only for reasonable and necessary health care items and services and excluding
those items that are not reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of illness
or injury).
238. See, e.g., BLUECROSS BLUESHIELD OF NORTH CAROLINA, MEDICARE C/D
MEDICAL COVERAGE POLICY: INVESTIGATIONAL (EXPERIMENTAL) SERVICES (2012),
http://www.bcbsnc.com/assets/services/public/pdfs/bluemedicare/medicalpolicy/investigatio
nal_services.pdf (generally excluding from coverage (with some exceptions)
“investigational” and/or “experimental” services, defined as “medical, surgical, psychiatric,
and other health care services, supplies, treatments, procedures, drug therapies, or
devices that are determined by the Plan to be either: (a) not generally accepted or
endorsed by health care professionals in the general medical community as safe and
effective in treating the condition, illness, or diagnosis for which their use is proposed, or
(b) not proven by scientific evidence to be safe and effective in treating the condition,
illness or diagnosis for which their use is proposed”).
239. See, e.g., STUDENT HEALTH INSURANCE PLAN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA,
LAS VEGAS 32 (2010–2011), https://wfis.wellsfargo.com/ProductServices/A%20to%20Z/
StudentInsurance/UNLV/graduatestudents/Documents/UNLV%2011%2012%20FINAL%2
0Aetna%20brochure.pdf; UPMC HEALTH PLAN POLICY & PROCEDURE MANUAL:
EXPERIMENTAL
AND
INVESTIGATIVE
SERVICES,
POLICY
MP.079
(2012),
http://www.upmchealthplan.com/pdf/pandp/pay.008.pdf (defining the “technologies,
devices, procedures, injectable drugs and biologics, vaccines and medical treatments that
are generally not covered” due to their experimental or investigative nature).
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private health plans routinely except from coverage experimental
and investigative services (and classify services as experimental
or investigative if (i) “[t]here [is] insufficient outcomes data
available from controlled clinical trials published in the peer
reviewed literature . . . to substantiate [the intervention’s] safety
and effectiveness for the disease or injury involved”; (ii) “[i]f
required by the FDA, approval has not been granted for
marketing”; (iii) “[a] recognized national medical or dental society
or regulatory agency has determined, in writing, that [the
intervention] is experimental, investigational, or for research
purposes”; or (iv) “the written protocol or protocols used by the
treating facility . . . states that [the intervention] is experimental,
investigational, or for research.”240)
Finally, in the context of human subjects research, even the
Common Rule does not allow state-required consent-to-treatment
241
forms to be used by an individual or a surrogate who is
consenting to research if that state form does not comply with the
Common Rule requirements. Instead, the Common Rule requires
a research-specific consent form that includes certain basic242 and
additional243 required elements, that has been approved by an
IRB, and that has been signed by the subject or the subject’s
LAR.244 Importantly, the Common Rule’s first required element is
that the consent-to-research form must state that the study
245
involves research, not treatment.
V. EMPIRICAL DATA ASSESSING LAY ATTITUDES TOWARDS
HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH
The previous Part argued that treatment and research are
intrinsically different activities, that government-supported
reliance on legislation governing consent to treatment to
answer research-related questions could provide continued
legal
and
conceptual
support
for
the
therapeutic
misconception, and that the content of consent-to-treatment
legislation may be inappropriate for research-related questions
240. Robert Taylor-Manning, Undefined Experimental Treatment Exclusions in
Health Insurance Contracts: A Proposal For Judicial Response, 66 WASH. L. REV. 809, 809
(1991); STUDENT HEALTH INSURANCE PLAN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA, LAS VEGAS,
supra note 239, at 32 (emphasis omitted).
241. See, e.g., 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 601.4(a)(1) (2012) (Tex. Med. Disclosure Panel,
Informed Consent) (requiring Texas physicians to obtain a patient’s consent to treatment
on a standard form).
242. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(1)–(8) (2011) (listing eight basic elements).
243. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(b)(1)–(6) (listing six additional elements).
244. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.117(a).
245. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(1).
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because researchers have a duty to collect data and report
research results, not to hold the best physical and mental
health interests of their participants as paramount. The
previous Part further argued that HHS should adopt standalone consent-to-research regulations that specifically address
the issues posed by research involving adults with impaired
decision-making capacity and that take into account the
potential conflicts of interest between and among researchers,
surrogates, and participants. To inform the content of such
regulations, Part V argues that HHS should at least
familiarize itself with the empirical literature that assesses
lay attitudes towards human subjects research involving
individuals with impaired decision-making capacity.
As background, the current law review and other academic
literatures tend to polarize conversations about the
appropriateness of human subjects research involving
individuals with impaired decision-making capacity into
protectionist and autonomy-based arguments, on the one hand,
and clinical- and research-based arguments made in support of
further biomedical and behavioral research on the other.246 The
current lack of federal regulation is, perhaps, a result of HHS’s
uncertainty regarding which of two binary positions—a
protection-oriented position or a research-favorable position—
HHS should adopt. This Part suggests that insights from the
lay public, including current and potential patients and human
subjects, may assist HHS in understanding the values of the
laypersons its regulations are designed to protect.247 Until
lawmakers better understand laypersons’ attitudes towards
human subjects research involving individuals with impaired
decision-making capacity, the willingness of laypersons to
allow surrogates to make research participation decisions on
their behalf, and the amount of leeway that laypersons would
246. See, e.g., AGS Ethics Committee, Informed Consent for Research on Human
Subjects with Dementia, 46 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 1308, 1308 (1998) (noting the debate
over when research can be conducted on those with impaired decision-making capacity
“address[es] the tension between providing adequate protection for subjects who are
vulnerable as a result of diminished capacity and allowing promising research to go
forward”); Berg, supra note 198, at 18, (“When science takes man as its subject, tensions
arise between two values basic to Western society: freedom of scientific inquiry and
protection of individual inviolability.” (citing JAY KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN
BEINGS 1 (1972)); DeRenzo, supra note 13, at 139 (“While taking care that research not
move forward so ruthlessly that we erode the fabric of our moral community, we must be
equally careful not to impede unnecessarily needed ethically and socially acceptable
research.” (endnote omitted)).
247. See Kim et al., supra note 33, at 150 (“[T]here have been very few attempts to
understand the attitudes of the lay public or of stakeholder groups regarding [surrogatebased research].”).
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grant their surrogates, lawmakers will struggle to craft
regulations that reflect the values of such laypersons.248
This Part thus analyzes empirical studies assessing current
public attitudes regarding human subjects research involving
adults with impaired decision-making capacity. As discussed in
more detail below, these empirical studies somewhat surprisingly
report that (i) surrogate consent to research is “probably” or
249
“definitely” acceptable in the context of minimal risk research;
(ii) surrogate consent to research may be appropriate in the
context of more risky studies;250 (iii) lay (or noncourt-appointed)
surrogates should be permitted to consent to riskless research on
251
behalf of relatives with impaired decision-making capacity;
(iv) enrolling individuals who are unable to consent to research in
research studies that offer no potential for medical benefit is
consistent with the preferences of at least some individuals and,
therefore, should not be absolutely prohibited provided there is
sufficient evidence that participation in such research is
consistent with the preferences of such individuals;252
(v) requiring a completed advance research directive (ARD) prior
to research participation by an individual with impaired decisionmaking capacity may be unduly restrictive in light of studies
suggesting that the rate of ARD completion is likely to be low;253
and (vi) allowing some or complete surrogate leeway, even over
prior first-person consent, is consistent with the preferences of at
least some individuals and should not be absolutely prohibited
provided there is sufficient evidence that surrogate leeway is
consistent with the preferences of such individuals.254
Representative studies are examined below.
In 2002, researchers from the NIH, the National Institutes
of Mental Health, and the Center for Research Methodology and
Biometrics in Denver published the results of a study designed to
systematically assess, for the first time, the attitudes of healthy
248. See, e.g., Jason Karlawish et al., Older Adults’ Attitudes Toward Enrollment of
Non-Competent Subjects Participating in Alzheimer’s Research, 166 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
182, 183 (2009) (“Until we better understand whether people are willing to participate in
nonbeneficial research that enrolls persons with Alzheimer’s disease and why they are
willing, policymakers cannot develop research ethics policies that respect the values of the
people they are designed to protect and that will resolve the controversy that has caused
some states and institutional review boards to limit substantially the practice of proxy
consent for research.”).
249. See infra text accompanying note 279.
250. See infra text accompanying notes 280–283 and 293.
251. See infra text accompanying notes 267–268 and note 274.
252. See infra text accompanying note 261.
253. See infra text accompanying note 262.
254. See infra text accompanying notes 289, 294, 298, and 300.

Do Not Delete

840

2/18/2013 4:08 PM

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[50:3

individuals who were familiar with clinical research (due to
having a family history of Alzheimer’s Disease (AD) and prior
research participation) towards five of the most prominent
proposed safeguards for research participants with impaired
decision-making capacity, that is, “1) restrictions on research
with no potential for medical benefit, 2) formal research advance
directives, 3) proxy decision makers, 4) restrictions on research
not associated with the individuals’ impairments, and 5) respect
for subjects’ dissent.”255
The study authors found that “[t]he vast majority of
respondents were willing to participate in clinical research” if
their ability to consent became impaired.256
[Ninety-two percent] were willing to participate in a study
that involved taking experimental medication that might
help them; 80% were willing to take experimental
medication that had no chance of helping them; 99% were
willing to participate in a study that involved a computer
task that would not help them; and 98% were willing to
participate in a study involving two X-rays that would not
257
help them.
With respect to their attitudes toward ARDs,
[89% of respondents] said they were willing to fill out [an
ARD] if asked to do so by their family, and . . . [86%] said they
would be willing if asked by their doctor. Eighty-one percent
said they preferred giving advance instructions rather than
allowing their family to make research [participation]
decisions for them [in the event of a loss of capacity to give
first-person consent] . . . . Eighty-eight percent stated that
their family could enroll them in research in the absence of
[an ARD], and 80% stated that their families could enroll
them in a potential benefit research even when their [ARD]
258
opposed [research participation].
Finally, with respect to the completion of ARDs, few (only
16% of the 246) ARD forms were actually completed by the
subjects and returned to the subject’s home research institution
within one year.259 However,
[95%] of the returned [ARDs] indicated a willingness to
participate in research that offered a potential for medical
255. See Dave Wendler et al., Views of Potential Subjects Toward Proposed
Regulations for Clinical Research with Adults Unable to Consent, 159 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
585, 585, 589 (2002).
256. Id. at 586.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 589.
259. Id.
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benefit; 95% indicated a willingness to participate in
minimal risk research with no potential for medical benefit;
[and] 51% indicated a willingness to participate in greater
than minimal risk research with no potential for medical
260
benefit.

The study authors ultimately concluded that enrolling
individuals who are unable to consent to research in a research
study that offers no potential for medical benefit is consistent
with the preferences of at least some individuals and, therefore,
should not be absolutely prohibited provided there is sufficient
evidence that research participation is consistent with the
preferences of such individuals.261 The study authors also
concluded that requiring such evidence to be provided in a formal
ARD may be unduly restrictive, especially because so few of the
respondents actually returned completed ARDs.262
The following year, researchers from the University of
Sherbrooke and the Sherbrooke University Geriatric Institute
published the results of a questionnaire-based study designed to
elicit the opinions of four different groups of concerned
individuals (“older adults, informal caregivers of cognitively
impaired individuals, researchers in ageing [sic], and members of
institutional review boards”) regarding who should decide
whether an older adult with impaired decision-making capacity
263
will participate in research. The study questionnaire included
(i) five questions describing hypothetical studies that
progressively increased the risk to the subject’s health, including
spending a few hours per week with a pet (Question 1), a qualityof-sleep study (Question 2), a new cream for treating bedsores
(Question 3), an experimental drug designed to slow the progress
of AD that carries the risk of constipation and dizziness
(Question 4), and painful brain injections that could reverse the
course of AD but that also involve serious risks of infection
(Question 5); (ii) two more general questions exploring the
conditions under which “the respondent feels it is acceptable to
solicit a cognitively impaired individual for research” (Questions
6 and 7); and (iii) a final, more personal question “ask[ing] the
respondents to specify in what cases they would agree that a
concerned relative who lacks legal authority decide on their

260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 589–90.
263. See Gina Bravo, Mariane Pâquet & Marie-France Dubois, Opinions Regarding
Who Should Consent to Research on Behalf of an Older Adult Suffering from Dementia, 2
DEMENTIA 49, 49, 51–52 (2003).
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behalf whether they will participate in a study, in the event that
they themselves become mentally incapacitated” (Question 8).264
(As background, the then-current law in Quebec allowed family
members to make healthcare decisions on behalf of patients with
impaired decision-making capacity but allowed only courtappointed legal guardians to consent to research on behalf of
265
human subjects with impaired decision-making capacity. )
The study authors found that a significant proportion of
266
those surveyed did not agree with the current law in Quebec. In
fact, most respondents supported the participation of individuals
with impaired decision-making capacity in research and would
require the consent of a legal guardian only when risks were
involved.267 Indeed,
[i]n the absence of risk to the subject’s health [(Questions 1
to 3)], less than one-third of the respondents chose the legal
guardian alone as the person best suited to make a
substituted decision. As the hypothetical study became
more risky [(Questions 4 and 5)], [the study authors found]
an increase in the proportion of respondents who preferred
268
that the surrogate decision-maker be legally appointed.
(However, the proportion of respondents who believed that
individuals with impaired decision-making capacity should “be
excluded from the study also increased, [making] the choice of
the best surrogate decision maker irrelevant.269)
The study authors also found that “[70%] of the respondents
considered it acceptable to invite [older adults with impaired
decision-making capacity] to participate in a hypothetical study
that involved serious risks to their health [(Question 5)], mostly
270
with the legal guardian’s consent.” “Opinions differed slightly
when respondents were asked the two general questions”
271
“More
(Questions 6 and 7) that lacked any context.
respondents, especially among older adults and informal
caregivers, opted simply to exclude [individuals with cognitive
impairments] from research.”272 The study authors interpreted
this finding as “prudence [that] could be due to the vagueness

264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

Id. at 52, 54–57.
Id. at 50 (citation omitted).
See id. at 61–62.
Id. at 63.
Id. at 61–62.
Id. at 62.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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inherent in the notion of risks and benefits.”273 In the end, the
study authors concluded that their findings suggested support for
amending Quebec legislation to allow lay (or nonguardian)
surrogates to consent to riskless research on behalf of relatives
with impaired decision-making capacity.274
In 2005, researchers from the University of Michigan and
the University of Rochester Medical Center published the results
of a study designed “to elicit the views of those at heightened risk
of [AD] regarding how they would balance the need for research
in [AD] with the need to protect vulnerable [subjects with
275
Using a mailed
impaired decision-making capacity].”
questionnaire, “the [study] authors surveyed the participants at
one of the sites of the AD Anti-Inflammatory Prevention Trial”276
and measured responses regarding the “acceptability of surrogate
consent for [ten] research scenarios of varying degrees of risks
and benefits, given from the perspectives of social policy,
personal preferences for self, and preferences when deciding on
behalf of a loved one.”277 The ten research scenarios involved an
observation, an interview, a blood draw, a magnetic resonance
imaging (MRI) procedure, a lumbar puncture, a drug challenge, a
biopsy, a drug randomized controlled trial (RCT), a vaccine, and
a gene transfer.278
Of the 229 participants who responded, a large majority
(more than 90%) responded that surrogate consent to research
was “probably” or “definitely” acceptable in the context of
minimal risk research studies (including observation, interview,
279
and blood draws) as well as RCTs of new medications. A
smaller majority responded that surrogate consent to research
280
was appropriate in the context of more invasive studies. For
example, 56% of the participants responded that a brain biopsy
study was “probably” or “definitely” acceptable and 54%
responded that a gene transfer study was “probably” or
“definitely” acceptable by society.281 The study authors further
found that
273. Id.
274. Id. at 63.
275. See Scott Y.H. Kim et al., What Do People at Risk for Alzheimer Disease Think
About Surrogate Consent for Research, 65 NEUROLOGY 1395, 1395 (2005).
276. Id. at 1395. “[A]ll participants [were] 70 years old or older with at least one
first-degree relative with dementia.” Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 1398 tbl.3.
279. Id. at 1395–97, 1398 tbl.3.
280. Id. at 1396.
281. Id. at 1396, 1398 tbl.3.
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[t]he acceptability of [surrogate consent to research] was
generally highest from the first-person perspective, then
from the societal perspective, and lowest from a surrogate’s
perspective of considering what to do for a loved one. For
the lumbar puncture [research scenario], for example, 69%,
65%, and 61% felt the study was [“probably” or “definitely”]
acceptable from the point of view of self, society, and
282
surrogate[, respectively].

The study authors ultimately concluded that laypersons at
heightened risk of AD do discriminate among research scenarios
of varying risks and burdens and that laypersons also are
supportive of surrogate consent to research even when the risks
and burdens are significant to the subjects.283
In 2009, researchers from the University of Michigan, the
University of Pennsylvania, the Mayo Clinic, and Columbia
University published the results of a survey designed “to assess
the views of a nationally representative, policy-relevant sample
of the general public (namely, older Americans) regarding
surrogate consent for four research scenarios of varying degrees
of risk and potential benefit” as well as the extent of latitude or
leeway that people would be willing to confer on their
surrogates.284 “[Following] a brief introductory background on AD
and the rationale for the survey,” a random subsample (n = 1,515) of
the 2006 wave of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a
biennial survey of a nationally representative sample of Americans
aged fifty-one and older, were given one of four surrogate-consent
based research (SBR) scenarios that approximated real studies in
AD, including “a lumbar puncture . . . , a randomized controlled
trial . . . of a new drug, a vaccine study, and a first-in-human gene
transfer neurosurgical study. . . . Then, the subjects were asked
three questions,” 285 including (i) “If patients cannot make their own
decisions about being in studies like this one, should our society
allow their families to make the decision in their place?”;
(ii) “Suppose you wanted to give a close family member instructions
for the future, in case you ever became unable to make decisions for
yourself. Would you say you would want to participate in the
study?”; and (iii) “How much freedom or leeway would you give the
close family member to go against your preference and
instead . . . enroll/not enroll . . . you in the study?”286

282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

Id. at 1396–97.
Id. at 1399–400.
See Kim et al., supra note 27, at 150.
Id. at 149–50.
Id. at 150, 152 tbl.2.
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Most of the respondents stated that . . . society should allow
[287]
family [SBR] (67.5% to 82.5%, depending on the scenario)
and [that they personally] would . . . want to participate in
[288]
Most respondents would also
SBR (57.4% to 79.7%).
grant some or complete leeway to their surrogates (54.8% to
66.8%), but this was true mainly of those willing to
[289]
participate.

“[A] significant minority (up to 45% for the gene transfer
scenario) would not allow leeway.”290 The study authors also
found a trend toward lower willingness to participate in SBR
among individuals who identified as racial or ethnic minorities.291
The study authors formally concluded that “[f]amily
surrogate consent-based dementia research is broadly supported
by older Americans” and that “[w]illingness to allow leeway
to . . . surrogates needs to be studied further for its ethical
292
significance for surrogate-based research policy.” The study
authors further concluded that “even for invasive studies[,] the
prior probability of an older American’s willingness to participate
in SBR is high.”293 The study authors also concluded that, “even
among those who are not willing to participate, there is a sizable
minority who are willing to confer some leeway on their
surrogates.”294 The study authors recognized several limitations
in their work, including the complicated scientific and policy
issues surrounding surrogate consent for research, and the
study’s focus on dementia, which may not generalize to other
areas of SBR.295
Also in 2009, researchers from the University of
Pennsylvania and the Philadelphia VA Medical Center published
the results of a research study designed to assess willingness to
have a surrogate make research participation decisions and, for
each of two AD biomarker studies (including a minimal risk

287. The percentage of respondents providing positive responses for each of the four
surrogate-based research scenarios for the first question (whether society should allow
family surrogate consent) was 67.5% (gene transfer), 70.5% (vaccine), 72.0% (lumbar
puncture), and 82.5% (drug randomized controlled study). Id. at 152 tbl.2.
288. The percentage of respondents providing positive responses for each of the four
surrogate-based research scenarios for the second question (whether one would want to
participate in the study) was 57.4% (vaccine), 68.7% (gene transfer), 70.8% (lumbar
puncture), and 79.7% (drug randomized controlled study). Id.
289. Id. at 149, 151–52 & tbl. 2.
290. Id. at 153.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 149, 153–54.
293. Id. at 154.
294. Id.
295. Id.
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blood draw and a greater than minimal risk blood draw and
lumbar puncture), willingness to grant advance consent, and
willingness to grant a surrogate leeway over advance consent.296
Of the 538 persons age sixty-five and older who resided in the
southeastern Pennsylvania region and participated in the study,
the majority (83%) granted advance consent to a blood draw
study and nearly half (48%) to a blood draw plus lumbar
puncture.297 A large majority of the respondents (96%) were
willing to identify a surrogate who would make research
participation decisions “and most were willing to grant their
proxy leeway over their advance consent.”298 “Combining [their]
preferences for advance consent and leeway, the proportion [of
respondents] who would permit being enrolled in the blood draw
and [spinal fluid samples studied], respectively, were 92% and
75%.”299 The study authors formally concluded that their data
suggest that “[o]lder adults generally support enrolling
[individuals with impaired decision-making capacity associated
with AD] into research that does not present a benefit to [such
individuals]” and that “[w]illingness to grant [surrogate] leeway
over advance consent and a favorable attitude [towards]
biomedical research substantially explain[s such] willingness.”300
The proposals set forth in Part VI of this Article are designed to
reflect, to some extent, the empirical data presented in this
Part V.
VI. A PROPOSAL FOR A NEW SUBPART “E” TO THE COMMON RULE
At least three options for the future regulation of research
involving adults with impaired decision-making capacity emerge.
The first option is to continue our current system of no specific
federal regulation and varying, if any, state regulation. This
option would continue to give research protocol creation and
approval discretion to researchers and IRBs, which have at their
disposal nonbinding federal guidance and recommendations,
including the OHRP’s answers to the public’s frequently asked
questions, the SIIIDR’s recommendations, and the NIH’s “Points
to Consider.” This option provides significant flexibility to
researchers and IRBs, although research subjects may be underor over-protected due to the lack of binding regulatory authority
and significant researcher and IRB discretion.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

See Karlawish et al., supra note 248, at 183.
Id. at 183–85.
Id. at 182, 185.
Id.
Id. at 182, 186.
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Second, an organization such as the Uniform Law
Commission (ULC) could adopt a “Uniform Research Involving
Adults with Impaired Decision-Making Capacity Act” that could
serve as model legislation for states that do not have any
research-specific provisions and for states that already have such
legislation when that legislation is different than neighboring
states. The ULC already has adopted other uniform health and
safety-related laws, including the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
(currently adopted by forty-five states and the District of
301
and the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act
Columbia)
(currently adopted by six states).302 If adopted by all fifty states,
this option would result in standard surrogate consent to
research provisions, which would be especially helpful for
researchers involved in multi-site, multi-state studies who
currently must adhere to a number of varying state laws. Given
that only six states have adopted the relatively noncontroversial
Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act, it is unlikely that a majority
of states would immediately adopt a “Uniform Research
Involving Adults with Impaired Decision-Making Capacity Act,”
thus resulting in a continuing patchwork of state law.
Third, HHS could add new provisions to the Common Rule
that would specifically govern, for the first time at the federal
level, human subjects research involving adults with impaired
decision-making capacity. The new provisions could be codified at
45 C.F.R. Part 46 (Subpart E) and would follow the current Basic
Policy for the Protection of Human Research Subjects (Subpart
A) and the special regulatory provisions that already apply to
pregnant women, fetuses, and neonates (Subpart B); prisoners
(Subpart C); and children (Subpart D). This option would result
in national research standards applicable to adults with impaired
decision-making capacity. Depending on the particular standards
that are adopted, however, research subjects could continue to be
under- or over-protected.
This Article supports the third option; that is, the addition
by HHS of a new Subpart E to the Common Rule specifically
governing human subjects research involving adults with
impaired decision-making capacity. The first option is
unacceptable because it promotes reliance on legislation

301. See Legislative Fact Sheet - Anatomical Gift Act (2006), UNIFORM L.
COMMISSION,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Anatomical
Gift Act (2006) (last visited Jan. 3, 2013).
302. See Legislative Fact Sheet - Health-Care Decisions Act, UNIFORM L.
COMMISSION,
http://uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Health-Care
Decisions Act (last visited Jan. 3, 2013).

Do Not Delete

848

2/18/2013 4:08 PM

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[50:3

governing consent to treatment to answer research-related
questions, which I found in Part IV to be problematic because
(i) treatment and research are intrinsically different activities;
(ii) government-supported reliance on legislation governing
consent to treatment to answer questions relating to consent to
research could provide continued legal and conceptual support
for the therapeutic misconception; and (iii) the content of
legislation governing consent to treatment is inappropriate for
research-related questions in light of the unique role of the
researcher, that is, the role of collecting data and reporting
research results, not holding the best physical and mental health
interests of research participants as paramount. Although the
substance of the second option could be virtually identical to the
substance of the third option, I believe it unlikely that fifty states
will adopt a “Uniform Research Involving Adults with Impaired
Decision-Making Capacity Act” when only six states have, to
date, adopted the relatively noncontroversial Uniform HealthCare Decisions Act.
This Article thus proposes the following structure for a new
Subpart E to the Common Rule:
45 C.F.R. PART 46
Subpart E: Additional Protections Pertaining to Biomedical
and Behavioral Research Involving Adults with Impaired
Decision-Making Capacity
§ 46.501: Applicability.
§ 46.502: Purpose.
§ 46.503: Definitions.
§ 46.504: Additional Duties of Institutional Review Boards.
§ 46.505: Minimal Risk Research.
§ 46.506: Greater than Minimal Risk Research Involving
the Prospect of Direct Benefit.
§ 46.507: Greater than Minimal Risk Research Likely to
Yield Generalizable Knowledge About Conditions Causing
or Resulting in Impaired Decision-Making Capacity.
§ 46.508: Additional Consent Form and Process
Requirements.
The first section, proposed § 46.501, would address the
applicability of Subpart E. Specifically, § 46.501 would state that
the regulatory provisions in Subpart E apply to all biomedical
and behavioral research conducted or supported by the
Department of Health and Human Services involving adults with
impaired decision-making capacity. (If HHS’s July 26, 2011
proposal to expand the Common Rule “to all [human subjects]
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research, regardless of funding source, conducted at institutions
in the [United States] that receive some Federal funding from a
Common Rule agency” is adopted,303 then proposed § 46.501
would simply state that the regulatory provisions in Subpart E
apply to all biomedical and behavioral research involving adults
with impaired decision-making capacity conducted at an
institution in the United States that receives some federal
funding from a Common Rule agency.) Proposed § 46.501 also
would specify that the requirements of Subpart E are in addition
to, not instead of, those imposed under the other Subparts of Part
46, including Subpart A’s Basic Policy for the Protection of
Human Research Subjects.
The second section, proposed § 46.502, would address the
purpose of Subpart E. Specifically, proposed § 46.502 would
explain that some individuals, due to neurological, psychiatric,
developmental, and other conditions, are unable to comprehend
sufficient information and may be incompetent to give informed
consent to their own research participation. Proposed § 46.502
also would explain, however, that additional research on the
physical and mental health conditions that cause or result in
impaired decision-making capacity remains necessary due to the
lack of available treatments. Proposed § 46.502 should clearly
state that it is the purpose of Subpart E to permit the conduct of
responsible biomedical and behavioral investigations while
providing additional safeguards for adults with impaired
decision-making capacity.
The third section, proposed § 46.503, would define specific
terms used in Subpart E. Terms requiring definition would
include, at a minimum, “Adults with Impaired Decision-Making
Capacity,” “Assent,” “Consent,” “Greater than Minimal Risk,”
“Legally Authorized Representative,” “Minimal Risk,” and
“Surrogate.” Although many of these definitions can be taken
from regulatory provisions codified elsewhere in the Common
Rule, the definition of “Adults with Impaired Decision-Making
Capacity” will be specific to Subpart E as will “Surrogate.” With
respect to “Adults with Impaired Decision-Making Capacity,”
HHS (through proposed regulations) should seek public comment
on the range of physical and mental health conditions that cause
303. See Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research
Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg.
44,512, 44,514 (proposed July 26, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 46, 160, 164; 21
C.F.R. pts. 50, 56) (discussing HHS’s proposal to extend federal regulatory protection “to
all research, regardless of funding source, conducted at institutions in the [United States]
that receive some Federal funding from a Common Rule agency for research with human
subjects”).
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or result in impaired decision-making capacity that could be used
to illustrate the types of persons who would be included in this
definition. With respect to “Surrogate,” HHS (through proposed
regulations) should seek public comment on the classes of
individuals (and their relative order) who may make a research
participation decision on behalf of an adult with impaired
decision-making capacity. Given that some empirical studies
support the use of lay surrogates (versus legal guardians, legal
conservators, and other court-appointed surrogates) for decisions
regarding research participation when the research involves only
minimal risk,304 the identification and relative ordering of lay and
legal surrogates should be carefully evaluated and should
include, at a minimum, consideration of the following
individuals: (i) the individual’s agent pursuant to an advance
research directive; (ii) the conservator or guardian of the
individual; (iii) the spouse or domestic partner of the individual;
(iv) an adult son or daughter of the individual; (v) a custodial
parent of the individual; (vi) any adult brother or sister of the
individual; (vii) any adult grandchild of the individual; and
(viii) an available adult relative with the closest degree of kinship
to the individual. Again, HHS (through proposed regulations)
should solicit comments on the relative priority of these
individuals.
The fourth section, proposed § 46.504, would specify an
additional duty of IRBs in research that involves adults with
impaired decision-making capacity. Specifically, proposed
§ 46.504 would require IRBs to find that there are good reasons
to involve adults with impaired decision-making capacity as
research subjects. Stated another way, IRBs would be required to
find that a proposed research protocol can be conducted only if
adults with certain neurological, psychiatric, developmental, and
other physical and mental conditions are involved. If the research
can be conducted with alternative (healthy) populations, then
individuals with impaired decision-making capacity should not
be enrolled in the research. The substance of proposed § 46.504 is
supported by the current empirical literature, which reports wide
agreement that individuals with impaired decision-making
capacity should not be involved in research that can adequately
be performed with healthy individuals with intact decisionmaking capacity.305 Because there remains to be conducted
important research on conditions that cause impaired decisionmaking capacity that will require the inclusion of individuals
304.
305.

See supra text accompanying note 267.
Kim et al., supra note 12, at 797–98.
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with such conditions,306 the remainder of Subpart E (including
proposed §§ 46.505–507) are necessary.
The fifth section, proposed § 46.505, would govern minimal
risk research involving adults with impaired decision-making
capacity. Specifically, proposed § 46.505 would state that
minimal risk biomedical or behavioral research involving adults
with impaired decision-making capacity may be carried out if
(i) the research is relevant to the individual’s condition; (ii) the
individual has given prior consent to participate in such research
through an ARD, or gives current assent to such research
participation, or does not object to such research participation;
and (iii) the individual’s surrogate consents to the individual’s
research participation. This provision is supported by the current
empirical literature that reports that laypersons support the use
of lay surrogates for research participation decisions made in the
context of minimal risk research307 Given that the empirical
literature finds some, but not unanimous, support for surrogate
leeway, additional empirical research should be conducted to
assess laypersons’ desires with respect to the procession of
minimal risk research when the individual objects but the
experimental intervention holds out the prospect of direct benefit
to the individual.
The sixth section, proposed § 46.506, would govern research
involving adults with impaired decision-making capacity in the
context of greater than minimal risk research that involves the
prospect of direct benefit to the individual. Specifically, if a greater
than minimal risk research study holds out the prospect of direct
benefit for an individual, proposed § 46.506 would clarify that such
research may proceed, but only if (i) the intervention that holds out
the prospect of direct benefit is only available in the context of
research; (ii) the risk is justified by the prospect of benefit to the
subjects; (iii) the relation of the risk to the anticipated benefit is at
least as favorable as that presented by available alternative
approaches; (iv) the individual has given prior consent to participate
in such research through an ARD, or gives current assent to such
research participation, or does not object to such research
participation; and (v) the individual’s LAR consents to the
individual’s research participation. This proposal is supported by
the current empirical literature that reports support for the conduct
of greater than minimal risk research that holds out the prospect of
direct benefit.308
306.
307.
308.

Id. at 798.
See supra text accompanying notes 267 & 274.
Beattie, supra note 23, at S27–28; Kim et al., supra note 12, at 801 (“For [adults
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The seventh section, proposed § 46.507, would govern
research involving adults with impaired decision-making
capacity in the context of greater than minimal risk research
that does not involve the prospect of direct benefit. Perhaps the
most controversial, this provision would answer the question
whether it is permissible to enroll incapacitated individuals in
risky research that likely will not benefit them. As discussed
in more detail in Part V, the current empirical literature does
not support an outright prohibition on this type of research.
That is, such research is consistent with the preferences of at
309
who perhaps recognize that gene
least some individuals
transfer studies, vaccine studies, immunotherapy, and drug
studies—although posing significant health and other risks—
can form the basis of future safe and efficacious treatments.310
Proposed § 46.507 would allow such research, but only if (i) the
anticipated knowledge is of vital importance for the
understanding or amelioration of the type of disorder or
condition of the individual; and (ii) the individual has given
prior consent to research participation of this type involving
greater than minimal risk and no prospect of direct benefit
through an advance research directive; or (iii) the individual
gives current assent to research participation and the
individual’s LAR consents to the individual’s research
participation, but only after a finding of clear and convincing
evidence that research participation is consistent with the prior
expressed preferences of the individual. The requirement for
clear and convincing evidence that research participation is
consistent with the individual’s prior expressed preferences
will prevent the involvement and exploitation of vulnerable
research participants who would not have wanted to
participate in such research, but will respect the autonomy of
individuals who, for altruistic or other reasons, would have
wanted to participate in the research. The requirement for
clear and convincing evidence mirrors the type of evidence that
is required by many states with respect to the withholding or
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from individuals who,
due to their conditions, are not able to express their consent to
such withholding or withdrawal.311
who lack decision-making capacity], there is little controversy that research
involving . . . anticipated direct benefit to the subject that is reasonable in relation to the
risk [is permissible].”).
309. See supra text accompanying notes 261 & 293.
310. See, e.g., Beattie, supra note 23, at S29–30; Kim et al., supra note 12, at 798.
311. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-11(c) (Lexis Nexis 2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63,
§§ 3080.3, 3080.4(A)(2) (West 2004 & Supp. 2012).
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A final section, proposed § 46.508, is necessary to deal with
the likelihood of subject, surrogate, and researcher therapeutic
misconception. That is, proposed § 46.508 would require
researchers to convey to subjects and surrogates during the
informed consent conversation, as well as to include in the
consent-to-research form, language addressing (i) the conceptual
distinctions between treatment and research; (ii) the specific
differences between individualized, adaptable treatment methods
and protocol-driven, double-blind, randomized, placebo-controlled
research procedures; (iii) the known, suspected, and unknown
risks associated with the research protocol; and (iv) the likelihood
that research participants may not directly benefit from the
research. Language addressing these topics would be in addition
to the other consent form and process requirements set forth in
312
Subpart A of the Common Rule.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article has proposed that HHS amend the Common
Rule to add a new Subpart E governing human subjects research
involving adults with impaired decision-making capacity.
Although HHS has amended the Common Rule several times
over the last few decades, “[the regulations] have not kept pace
with the evolving human research enterprise,” including the
marked increase in the volume of biomedical and behavioral
research, “the proliferation of multi-site clinical trials and
observational studies,” the expansion of research in particular
areas, including neurology and psychiatry, and the use of new
research technologies, including functional magnetic resonance
imaging.313 Stakeholders have criticized the decades-old
regulations on many grounds, including the extent and quality of
the protections afforded by the regulations’ consent provisions,
the lack of calibration between the risks posed by a particular
research protocol and the required level of institutional review,
and “the multiple . . . [and] differing regulatory requirements
that can apply to a single research study.”314 The proposals in this
Article not only respond to these criticisms in the context of
312. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2011) (establishing the general requirements for
informed consent to research participation); 45 C.F.R. § 46.117 (2011) (establishing
requirements relating to the documentation of informed consent to research
participation).
313. Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research
Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg.
44,512, 44,512–13 (proposed July 26, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 46, 160, 164;
21 C.F.R. pts. 50, 56).
314. See id. at 44,513–14.
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research involving adults with impaired decision-making
capacity, but they also create an appropriate balance among
competing interests, that is, the protection of vulnerable human
research subjects, the respect for (and promotion of) research
subject autonomy, and the need for additional research into the
neurological, psychiatric, developmental, and other conditions
that result in impaired decision-making capacity.

